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RULE 5
THE PROPOSED NORTH DAKOTA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
CHARLES LIEBERT CHUM*
PART Two: RULES 5 THROUGH 12
This paper continues the analysis of the proposed rules of civil
procedure for the district courts of North Dakota which com-
menced in a preceding issue of the North Dakota Law Review.'
Rule 5 deals with the service and filing of pleadings and other
papers. As is true in the case of Rule 4, it incorporates a few
changes in the law of this state. The text of the first three sections
of the rule is as follows:
RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS
AND OTHER PAPERS
(a) Service: When Required. Every order required by its
terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numer-
ous defendants, every written appearance, demand, offer of
judgment,2 and similar paper shall be served upon each of the
parties,' but no service need be made on parties in default for
failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or addi-
tional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them
in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.'
(b) Same: How Made. Whenever under these rules ser-
vice is required or permitted to be made upon a party repre-
sented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the at-
torney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made
by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last
known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with
the clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy within this rule
means: handing it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving
it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof;
or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place
therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has
* Associate Professor of Law. University of North Dakota.
1. Crum, The Proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N. Dak. L. Rev.
88 (1956). For a more generalized appraisal, see Holtzoff, New Civil Procedure in North
Dakota, 32 N. Dak. L. Rev. 81 (1956).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a), from which this rule is derived, inserts the words "designa-
tion of record on appeal" at this point.
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) inserts the words "affected thereby" at this point. and the
same phrase was included in the original draft of the North Dakota rules. It was deleted
from the proposed rules by the amendents of June 17, 1955, filed with the Supreme Court
b" the rules committee.
4. The superseded statutory provisions are N. D. Rev. Code §1 28-2810, 28-2819
28-2821 and 31-0510 (1943). Except as indicated in notes 2 and 3, supra, the language
of this provision is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
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no offic , leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and -discretion then
residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing.5
(c) Same: Numerous Defendants. In any action in which
there are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court,
upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that service of-
the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be
made as between the defendants, and that any cross-claim,
counter-claim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirma-
tive defense therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided,
by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading.
and service thereof upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of
it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be served
upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
6
A. Comparison with Federal Rules. While' these sections of Rule
5 follow the comparable provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure very closely, there is one significant difference. Federal
Rule 5(a) only requires 'service of documents upon parties "affec-
ted thereby." 7 This qualification has been omitted from the North
Dakota rule. The question posed by the omission Js whether failure
to make service of an order; notice, or other document upon a party
not affected by it would constitute reversible error. On balance
it would seem it should not, but the risk of reversal plainly rests
upon a party who fails to comply fully with the rule.
B. Contrast with Rule 4.. Rule 5 furnishes an interesting con-
trast with Rule 4, which-provides for the contents and service of
process. Whereas Rule- 4. has for its objective the attainment of
jurisdiction by service of the jurisdictional doeuments upon .the
parties to the litigation; the objective of Rule 5 is to channel service.
.of all other papers toward the attorney rather than the client, -once
the cause has been properly launched. In this it-seems workman-
like arid lawyerly. While methods of serving such papers upon. the
litigants in person are necessarily prescribed by it, the rule is
described by commentators as mandatory9 in providing that where
a party has counsel the papers in the case flow to the counselor
-rather than the client.1.
5. The 'superseded statutory provisions are N. D. Rev. Code if 28-2811, 28-814,
-28-2812, 28-2813 and 28-2830 (1943). N. D. R. Civ. P. 5(b) is identical with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5(b).
6. This rule is taken verbatim from the Federal Rules and no provision dealing with
the same subject matter is found in the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943.
7. See note 3, supra.
8. See N. D. R. Civ. P. 1,. and comment thereon in Crum, aupra note 1, at 95-96.
9. 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 1 203 (Rules Ed. 1950).
10. The North Dakota statutes are, in their terms, not quite as clear as the language
of Rule 5. Compare the language of N. D. Rev. Code J 28-2810 (1943), which "permits"
service of documents on attorneys, with N. D. Rev. Code 1 28-2814 (1943), which "re-
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C. Papers Covered by Rule 5. No all-inclusive enumeration of
the types of papers covered by the rule is possible. It plainly gov-
erns service of pleadings subsequent to the complaint, notices,"
most orders, appearances, demands, offers of judgment and motions.
North Dakota precedent indicates it might not be considered to
govern the entry of an order for judgment.-
D. Service on Attorney. The provision of Rule 5 requiring ser-
vice upon the attorney is somewhat broader than the statutes the
rule supersedes. This means that in some instances papers which
would have been served on the client will now be received by the
lawyer. To illustrate, under N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2821 (1943)
service of any paper to bring a party into contempt was necessarily
made upon the party individually. Under the new rules it would
appear that such documents - e.g., an order to show cause why a
party should not be held in contempt- are to go to the attorney
in the case. 13
Similarily it was held in Commercial Credit Co. v. Braseth14 that
the statutory permission of the Code to serve papers upon the at-
torney applied "only to those papers which relate to matters which
can be attended to by the attorneys and which do not require a
party to do, or not to do, something personally." 5 Holdings under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have observed no such dis-
tinction. The difference in practice is clearest in the case of orders
for pre-trial examination of adverse parties. Present North Dakota
practice is to issue a subpoena. 1 The federal practice is to issue
notice to counsel, a subpoena being considered unnecessary in the
case of a litigant.'-
Under the provisions of Rule 5(b), service on an attorney may
quires" it. It should be pointed out that Rule 5(b) permits the court to order service on
the party himself if this proves to be desirable. Barron and Holtzoff cite cases wherein
federal courts, without advance permission, have upheld service on a party instead of the
attorney. See note 9. supra.
11. Including the notice of appeal, Gouler and Goer v. Eidsness, 18 N. D. 338, 121
N.W. 83 (1909), and notice of change of venue, DeMars v. Gardner, 27 N. D. 60, 145
N.W. 129 (1914).
12. Gould v. Duluth and Dakota Elevator Co., 3 N. D. 96, 54 N.W. 316 (1893).
The case turns on the construction of N. D. Rev. Code § 28-001 (1943), which is super-
seded by N. D. R. Civ. P. 58 but appears consistent with the language of that rule.
13. N. L. R. B. v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 104 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1939); Tilgham
v. Tilgham, 57 F. Supp. 417 (D. C. 1944).
14. 61 N. D. 180, 237 N.W. 699 (1931).
15. Id. at 183, 237 N.W. at 700. Compare Larson v. Larson, 9 S. D. 1, 67 N.W.
842 (1896); Hennessy v. Nicol, 105 Cal. 138, 38 Pac. 649 (1894) (both cases in-
volving orders for temporary alimony); State ex rel. Hammer v. Downing, 40 Ore. 309, 66
Pac. 917 (1901) (contempt poceedings against evasive judgment debtor).
16. Commercial Credit Co. v. Braseth, supra.
17. Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 744 (1944);
French v. Zalstem-Zalessky, 1 F. R. D. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Spaeth v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, I F. R. D. 729 (S. D. N. Y. 1941). But see N. D. Rev. Code 5 31-0203 (1943).
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be made in either of two fashions: personally or by mail. Personal
service is accomplished by delivery, which may be made by simply
handing the document to the attorney in person or depositing it at
his house ' or office under the conditions specified in the rule. The
law which the Supreme Court of North Dakota has developed about
personal delivery to the lawyer seems little affected by the language
of the rule. The delivery must, under present precedent, be made
to the attorney of record in person rather than to associate counsel
who lacks a special authority to receive the document or admit
service thereof. 19 It has, however, been held that service of a
rotice of appeal- the document involved in most of the litigated
cases - is valid where it is addressed to the firm of the attorney of
record instead of to the attorney of record by his personal name.
2
1
It goes without saying that under the provisions of this rule an
attorney has no power to accept service of a summons for his client
in the absence of a special authorization so to do.21
In the case of service by mail the language of Rule 5(b) appears
to iron out a technical wrinkle in the law. This is illustrated by
Garske v. Hann,'2 wherein attorney A served notice of appeal by
mail upon attorney B, a resident of the same city, only to find that
the service was invalid because the Code 23 authorizes service by
mail only when the server and the served reside in different places.
The new rules impose no such requirement. In its stipulation that
service by mail is complete upon mailing, Rule 5(b) merely re-
states existing case law.& It is not necessary that the notice or other
document be actually received.-
18. The rule speaks of leaving the document at the attorney's "dwelling house or
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein."
This seems to suggest a way around the problem of McKenzie v. Boynton, 19 N. D. 531,
125 N.W. 1059 (1910), involving residence in a hotel.
19. McKenzie v. Bismarck Water Co., 6 N. D. 361, 71 N.W. 608 (1897).
20. Bank of Commerce v. Pick, 13 N. D. 74, 99 N.W. 63 (1904). While service by
firm name is thus good, what about service by reference to official position? In Ross. v.
City of Kenmare, 27 N. D. 487, 146 N.W. 897 (1914), it was held that service of notice
of entry of judgement by mail on "The City Attorney, Kenmare, N. Dak." was not- valid
st, as to set the time for appeal running. The same thing is true a fortiori where the record
fails to designate an attorney at all and service is made upon one not so listed. American
Loan & Investment Co. v. Dalen, 49 N. D. 323, 191 N.W. 490 (1922). The cases in this
note and in note 19 above all involve situations werein services on the attorney was
relied upon as starting the time for appeal to running. The court is inclined to he ex-
tremely technical about this. "The right of appeal is in the highest degree valuable to the
litigant,, and there is abundance of authority holding that where a party seeks to restrict
or limit such right by the service of notice or papers of any description he will be held to
strict and technical exactness of practice." McKenzie v. Bismarck Water Co., 6 N. D.
361, 371-72, 71 N.W. 608, 611 (1897).
21. Taylor v. Oulie, 55 N. D. 253, 212 N.W. 931 (1927).
22. 48 N. D. 42, 182 N.W. 933 (1921).
23. N. D. Rev. Code A 28-2812 (1943).
24. Fargo Silo Co. v. Pioneer Stock Co., 42 N. D. 48, 171 N.W. 849 (1919); Cedar
Rapids Nat. Bank v. Coffey, 25 N. D. 457, 141 N.W. 997 (1913); see Clyde v. Johnson,
4 N. D. 92, 95, 58 N.W. 512, 513 (1894).
25. Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Coffey, supra note 24; Clyde v. Johnson, supra note 24.
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E. Eflect of Default. Rule 5(a) provides that no service need
be made on parties in default for failure to appear except that
pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them
must be served pursuant to Rule 4. The limitation that the default
n,ust consist of failure to appear, rather than failure to plead in
time, should be carefully noticed. Where the default is merely
technical, as where a party has a procedural motion pending but
fails to submit an answer in time,2" all the protection of Rule 5 is
available.
The text of the two remaining portions of Rule 5 is as follows:
(d) Filing.
(1) All pleadings, affidavits, bonds, and other papers in an
action shall be filed with the clerk, unless otherwise provided
by statute or by order of the court, at or prior to the time of
the filing of the note of issue, or at or prior to the pre-trial con-
ference, if one is held.27
(2) All affidavits, notices and other papers designed to be
used upon the hearing of a motion or order to show cause shall
be filed prior to the hearing unless otherwise directed by the
court."
(3) If a party fails to comply with this subdivision, the
Court, on motion of any party or of its own motion may order
the papers to be filed forthwith and if the order is not obeyed,
the Court may order them to be regarded as stricken and their
service to be of no effect.2'
(e) Removal of Pleadings for Service. Upon the request of
the party filing the same, any original pleading or paper in any
civil action or proceeding, which by law is required to be filed
in the office of the clerk of the court in which such action or
proceeding is pending, may be removed from the files for the
purpose of serving the same either within or without the state,
but shall be returned thereto without delay."'
A. Filing. Rule 5(d) diverges sharply from the comparable pro-
vision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
merely that "all papers after the complaint required to be served
upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or
within a reasonable time thereafter." It may be suggested that
despite the considerable particularity with which the North Dakota
26. A situation illustrated by Naderhoff v. Geo. Benz & Sons, 25 N. D. 165, 141 N.W.
501 (1913). Where the motion goes to the merits even a technical default is not nresent.
27. The superseded statutory provisions are N. D. Rev. Code §0 28-0511, 68-3005
(1943).
28. This provision is new, being found neither in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
nor in the Code.
29. This provision is new, being found neither in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
nor in the Code, though it shows traces of origin in N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0511 (1943).
30. This supersedes N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0630 (1943).
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rules deal with the subject, they are to be regarded primarily as
directory rather than mandatory. This is indicated by the language
of Rule 5(d) (1), which imposes, it will be noticed, two deadlines
instead of one for filing papers: either prior to the filing of the note
of issue"1 or prior to the pre-trial conference. Undoubtedly the
more detailed provisions of the North Dakota rules were inspired
by occasional instances of delay in filing32
B. Removal of Pleadings for Service. Rule 5(e) merely restates
the provisions of N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0630 (1943), with the addi-
tion of a requirement that when papers are removed from the files
for service they must be returned promptly.
RULE 6. TIME
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time pre-
scribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after
which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be in-
cluded unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a
Sunday nor a holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Sundays and
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 3
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or a notice given
thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to
be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown
may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made be-
fore the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect;
but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
rules 4(g) (8), 50(b), 52(b), 59(c), (i) and (j), and 60(b),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 4
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The period of time
provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceed-
ing is not affected or limited by the continued existence or ex-
31. The form, contents, and purpose of'the note of issue are set forth in N. D. Rev.
Code 1 28-1208 (1943).
32. See Burke v. Minekota Elevator Co., 48 N. D. 795, 186 N.W. 948 (1922).
33. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), but omits the last sentence of
that rule, which provides that "A half holiday shall be considered as other days and not
as a holiday." N. D. R. Civ. P. 6(a) is not listed by the joint committee as superseding
any North Dakota statute.
31. The superseded statutory provisions are N. D. Rev. Code HI 28-0739, 28-2818,
21-2902, 28-2903 and 28-3006 (1943). The text of this provision follows the language
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) verbatim, with the exception that the rules excepted from the
operation of Rule 6(b) by its text differ somewhat from those listed in the Federal Rules.
This is a matter discussed in the text, infra.
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piration of a term of court. The continued existence or expira-
tion of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court
to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which
has been pending before it.3
(d) For Motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other than
one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time
specified fnr the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by
Sthese rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion
is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the
motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), op-
posing affidavits may be served not later than one day before
the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time. 6
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
served upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
37
A. General Appraisal. Rule 6 follows the federal pattern very
closely, diverging from the language of the Federal Rules in only
a few minor particulars. Despite the fact it is cut from a bolt of
federal cloth, its provisions harmonize smoothly in most instances
with existing practice and statutory provisions in this state. Most
of its provisions are concerned primarily with problems of a vir-
tually mechanical nature - how to compute time and the like -
and accordingly require little comment. However, the section of
the rule dealing with the enlargement of time does present some
questions of larger interest.
B. Enlargement of Time. Most of the situations which arise
when a lawyer finds himself pressed for time in the preparation of
z pleading or the taking of some necessary step in litigation are
settled by agreement beforehand among the counsel involved in the
case. There exists in this respect a very considerable professional
courtesy among practitioners.
This attitude among the members of the Bar has been reflected
for many years in the statutory provisions relating to enlargement
35. Rule 6(c) does not supersede any North Dakota statutory provision, though it
embodies a principle already accepted in the law of this state. See text discussion, infra.
36. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ P. 6(d). The superseded statutory pro-
visions are N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2803, 28-2815, 28-2817 and 28-2818 (1943).
37. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e). The superseded statutory pro-
vision is N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2816 (1943).
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of time found in the present Code." It was said in one early case :
that the powers given the North Dakota trial courts to enlarge the
time within which steps in litigation might be taken indicated a
broader discretion than was vested in the courts of almost any
other state. Rule 6(b), which supersedes the present statutes re-
h.ting to extensions of time, quite plainly continues this policy of
liberality, and it may be presumed that the course of decision in
those cases where an enlargement of time is requested will continue
to be much what it has been in the past. Neither Rule 6(b) nor
the existing statutes, of course, countenance unreasonable delay,
and the discretion of the judges upquestionably has been exercised
in past cases in the direction of expediting lawsuits as far as reason-
ably possible. But the chief element in the cases has been precisely
this element of discretion on the part of the trial court, ' the dis-
cretion being, it should be added, a "judicial discretion"4 review-
able as such, directed toward the technical question of practice
rather than the merits," and based on a showing of good cause. 1
To illustrate the character of the discretion involved, a few holdings
may be set forth. It has been held that a showing that papers and
files necessary for settling the statement of the case were in pos-
session of the district judge during the time set for making up the
statement was not sufficient to justify an extension of time, where
there was no additional showing that the attorney involved had
made any effort to obtain such papers from the judge. 4  Confusion
existing between two firms of attorneys employed by a single liti-
gant, whereby each firm thought the other was attending to a
matter in litigation, did not justify an extension of time." Con-
38. These are listed in note 34, supra.
39. Smith v. Hoff, 20 N. D. 419, 424, 127 N.W. 1047, 1049 (1910). See also
Sharon Milling Co. v. Galde, 54 N. D. 817, 211 N.W 589 (1926), which states that the
statute relating to extension of time is remedial and is to he liberally construed.
40. Brey v. Tvedt, 74 N. D. 192, 21 N.W.2d 49 (1945); Millers & Traders State
Bank v. National Fire Insurance Co., 55 N. D. 149, 212 N.W. 834 (1927); Sharon
Milling Co. v. Galde, 54 N. D. 817, 211 N.W. 589 (1926).
41. Sharon Milling Co. v. Galde, 54 N. D. 817, 211 N.W. 589 (1926).
42. Tuttle v. Pollock, 19 N. D. 308, 123 N.W. 399 (1909). It is said in Sharon
Milling Co. v. Galde, supra note 41, that the discretion which the court exercises "is as to
the 'good cause' shown for the delay, not as to the merits." 54 N. D. at 819, 211 N.W.
at 590.
43. Where the delay which necessitates an extension of time relates to the filing of
some document other than a pleading, such as a proposed statement of the case for
appeal, the showing of good cause has customarily been made by filing an affidavit of
merit. The same requirement exists in connection, with an application extending the time
in which to file an answer after a default has occurred, but proper practice is said to
require the submission of a proposed answer, verfied, and setting up a defense which is
valid on its face; though this latter requirement has sometimes been dispensed with.
Braseth v. County of Bottineau, 13 N. D' 344, 100 N.W. 1082 (1904); Wheeler v.
Castor, 11 N. D. 347, 92 N.W. 381 (1902).
44. Folsom v. Norton, 19 N. D. 722, 125 N.W. 310 (1910).
45. Sharon Milling Co. v. Galde, 54 N. D. 817, 211 N.W. 589 (1926).
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versely, an honest mistake concerning the date a pleading was re-
quired to avoid default,4" the existence of other proceedings affect-
ing the cause at issue,4 7 and the necessity of a technical amendment
to the pleadings to allow the issues in the case to be fully ex-
plored, 4" have been held sufficient to justify enlargements of time.
By its terms the time for doing certain actions may not be ex-
tended under Rule 6(b). The time limit of 10 days after verdict
applicable to motions for judgment non obstante verdicto estab-
lished by Rule 50(b) cannot be extended under Rule 6(b). A
motion to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule
52(b) must be made not later than ten days after entry of judg-
inent " and cannot be made later under Rule 6(b). The time limits
applicable to a motion for a new trial established by Rule 59(c)
are likewise hard and fast, as is the time limit on the right of the
court to order a new trial sua sponte conferred by Rule 59(i).
Equally, the ten-day time limit on motions to alter or amend a
judgment established by Rule 59(j) is incapable of enlargement;
and the same thing is true of the three-year time limit applicable to
the right of a defendant served with summons by publication to
open up a default judgment under Rule 4(g) (8).
Are there any limitations on the power of enlargement of time
tinder the Rules other than those listed above? As of this writing,
the answer appears to be in the negative; the existence in Rule
6(b) itself of these specific exceptions to its operation would seem
to exclude the idea there are others."' On the basis of the text of
the rules available to the writer, this raises the question whether
Rule 6(b) would permit an extension of the time for taking an
appeal. In terms the provisions of Rule 6(b) do not forbid this."
46. Braseth v. County of Bottineau, 13 N. D. 344, 100 N.W. 1082 (1904).
47. Smith v. Hoff, 20 N. D. 419, 127 N.W. 1047 (1910).
48. Brey v. Tvedt, 74 N. D. 192, 21 N.W.2d 49 (1945).
49. This is a rough proposition if it means precisely what it says. It would seem to the
writer that Rule 52(h) ought to be amended to provide that a motion to amend or
make additional findings of fact must be made not later than ten days after service of the
notice of entry of judgment. See the amendment to the same effect made in Rule 59(j)
b, the Supplement Report of the Joint Committee to the Supreme Court on June 17, 1955.
50. The federal cases have developed a few holdings which ought to be mentioned
with respect to Rule 6(b). The argument has been made in at least one case that since a
statute of limitations was procedural in its nature, the time for bringing an action barred
by the statute of limitations could be extended under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). This extreme
view was naturally rejected. Lusk v. Lyon, 9 F. R. D. 250 (Mo. 1949). In Anderson v.
Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482 .(1947), a notable case, the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that a two-year time limit provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a) for the substitution of
a personal representative of a deceased party to a lawsuit could not he extended under
Rule 6(b) because of the disruption which might be caused in probate proceedings as a
consequence. N. D. R. Civ. P. 25(a) follows the lead of the federal advisory committee
on rules and deletes the time limitation involved just the same.
51. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2902 (1943), which Rule 6(b) supersedes, provides that
the power of enlargement does not extend to the time for taking an appeal. As originally
drafted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) contained a similar provision, but this was stricken in 1948
19571
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But the philosophy behind the hard-and-fast time limits the rule
imposes on motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
motions to amend or make additional findings of fact, and motions
for a new trial is plainly one of promoting finality of judgments. 5:
It is to be expected that as finally adopted the Rules will impose a
similarly inflexible limit on the time for appealing, probably in th3
sections devoted to appeals.5A3
C. Terms of Court. In the federal system, the adoption of Rule
6(c) - which divorces questions of time from the continuance or
expiration of a term of court - constituted a major reform. North
Dakota has had the principle of Rule 6(c) embodied in its law for
many years."
D. Notice of Motion. Rule 6(d) shortens the period of notice
required prior to the hearing of a motion from eight days, as pre-
scribed by N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2815 (1943), to five. Eight days'
notice is, of course, still required where service of the notice of
hearing with respect to the motion is made by mail."5 This time
may be shortened in the discretion of the court where cause exists.51
E. Service by Mail.57 Under N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2816 (1943)
by amendment to allow the matter of time for appeal to be more fully regulated by another
section of the Federal Rules. See Note of the Advisory Committee on Amendment to Rule
6, set forth at length in I Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 211, n. 2
(Rules Ed. 1950). At present the time for taking an appeal under the Federal Rules "s
strictly limited and cannot be extended under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). 1 Barron & Holtzoff,
op cit. supra, at 379.
52. See Note of the Advisory Committee on Amendment to Rule 6, 1 Barron & Holtz-
.off. op cit. supra note 51.
53. The section of the North Dakota Rules relating to appeals has not been fully
completed at the time of this writing. To look briefly to the merits of the question, what
considerations require making the time limit for appeal a' hard and fast one? If one
assumes a, case wherein an attorney suddenly dies the day before an appeal must be com-
pleted, thereby causing a defeated litigant to lose the right to appeal from an improper
decision, the argument for existence of a power of enlargement becomes a rather attractive
one. The argument on the other side is that the inflexible time limit on the right of appeal
promotes finality of judgment and certainty of rights, with advantage to the public ;n
general. As to the present law of appeal in North Dakota, see Neff, The Reviewable Orders
Statute of North' Dakota, 28 N. Dak. L. Rev. 186 (1952); Newton, Appellate Practice
and Procedure in North Dakota, 27 N. Dak. L. Rev. 155 (1951).
54. Martinson v. Marzolf, 14 N. D. 301, 309-10, 103 N.W. 937, 940 (1905). See
also N. D. Rev. Code 1 27-0507 (1943).
55. N. D. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
56. State v. Movius Land & Loan Co., 53 N. D. 656, 207 N.W. 492 (1926). But it
would appear the time can't be shortened too much. In Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely
Thresher Co., 61 N. D. 452, 238 N.W. 552 (1931), a motion was noticed for hearing
on the same day it was made. The Court unhesitatingly held it a mere nullity. When is a
motion made? When it is served on the opposing party, not when it is filed with the clerk
of court. Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538 (N. D. 1953).
57. Errata. Attention is called to an error which crept into the first installment of this
paper. On pag 103 of 32 N. Dak. L. Rev. the writer inadvertently made a reference to
Rule 6(e) as doubling the stated period when service is made by mail. The statement was
made in reliance upon the printed text of the proposed rules appearing in the pamphlet
"'Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of North Dakota" published
by the West Publishing Company, and overlooked the fact that Rule 6(e) had been
amended by the supplemental report amending the proposed rules filed with the Supreme
Court of North Dakota on June 17, 1955.
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when service of a pleading or other document is made by mail, the
time limit for the necessary response is automatically doubled. Rule
6(e) shortens the extension of time resulting from service by mail,
allowing merely an additional three days for such response. The
time of service by mail is the date of mailing. 5  It is complete when
the letter, properly addressed, is placed in the mtils, even though
the letter may never be received by the person to whom it is ad-
dressed. "
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM OF MOTIONS
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer;
and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-
claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an
original party is summoned under Rule 14; and there shall be a
third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may
order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer."
(b) Motions and Other Papers.
(1) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be
made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds
therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. The re-
quirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a
written notice of the hearing of the motion.6 1
(2) The rules applicable to captions, " signing,63 and
other matters of form of pleadings apply to all motion and
other papers provided for by these rules.64
(3) A motion to vacate or modify a provisional remedy
shall have preference over all other motions.-
(c) Demurrers, Pleas, Etc., Abolished. Demurrers, pleas,.
58. Fargo Silo Co. v. Pioneer Stock Co., 42 N. D. 48, 171 NW. 849 (1919); Clyde
v. Johnson, 4 N. D. 92, 58 N.W. 512 (1894). Fargo Silo Co. v. Pioneer Stock Co.,
supra. adds the point that it is the actual date of the mailing, not the date of the post-
mark, which is determinative.
59. Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Coffey, 25 N. D. 457, 141 N.W. 997 (1913); see
Clyde v. Johnson, 4 N. D. 92, 95, 58 N.W. 512, 513 (1894) (dictum to same effect).
60. The text of Rule 7(a) is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) as given in 1 Bar-
ron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 1 241, n. 2.1 (Supp. 1956). The super-
seded statutory provisions are N. D. Rev. Code 11 28-0702, 28-0704, 28-0716 and 28-0717
(1943).
61. This is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (1). The superseded statutory pro-
visions are N. D. Rev. Code Of 28-2801, 28-2802, 28-2803 and 28-0810 (1943).
62. N. D. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
63. N. D. R. Civ. P. 11.
64. This is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (2). The superseded statute is N. D.
Rev. Code J 28-2810 (1943).
65. This is new matter introduced by the North Dakota committee. It is based on
the provisions of N. D. Rev. Code 1 28-2806 (1943), which it supersedes.
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and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading shall not be
used.6
A. Permissible Pleadings. In terms Rule 7(a) merely performs
the function of enumerating the permissible pleadings in a civil
action without prescribing their content. Commentators on the fed-
eral rules, comparing its effect on the law of pleading with that of
the vastly more important Rule 8, have regarded it primarily as a
sort of housekeeping or administrative provision and have had
comparatively little to say about it.67
The specific pleadings it prescribes are more appropriately taken
up under other headings. Thus, as to the complaint, see the dis-
cussion under Rule 8(a). As to the answer, see the discussion
following Rules 8(b) and (c). ""
B. Replies. There is, however, one pleading appropriately dis-
cussed here. This is the reply. While it has been said that the basic
effect of Rule 7(a) is to prescribe a two-stage rather than three-
stage system of pleading,'" Rule 7(a) nevertheless requires a reply
where the answer contains a counterclaim specifically pleaded as
such'" and also gives the court a discretionary power to order a
reply where it seems advisable.7 1 Under the existing law of this
state, practice is very similar. A reply is required where an answer
states a counterclaim72 and may be required in the discretion of the
court where the answer asserts new matter, i. e., sets up a plea in
confession and avoidance.741 If the construction placed on Rule
66. This is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(c). It supersedes N. D. Rev. Code §I
28-0718, 28-0704, 28-070.5, 28-0706, 28-0707, 28-0708, 28-0709, 28-0734, 28-0716
(1943).
67. Thus, Judge Charles E. Clark refers to it as one of a group of rules 'which "could
he modified and some peihaps omitted without substantially affecting the result." Clark,
Simplified Pleading, 2 F. R. D. 456, 464 (1943).
68. Discussion of third-party pleadings as a separate topic is omitted here, on the
view that the principles applicable to the more conventional pleadings indicate what is
proper in this connection.
69. Blume, The Scope of a Civil Action, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257, 277 (1943).
70. Rule 7(a) also requires, it will be noted, "an answer to a cross-claim, if the
answer contains a cross-claim." As to the distinction between a counter-claim and a
cross-claim, see the discussion under N. D. R. Civ. P. 13(g) in the next installment of
this paper.
71. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 81 F. Supp. 580 (S. D. W. Va. 1949); United
States v. Hole, 38 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mont. 1941); Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance
Co., 1 F. R. D. 386 (W. D. Mo. 1940), app. dismissed, 127 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1942).
72. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0716 (1943) provides that "When the answer contains new
matter constituting a counterclaim, the plaintiff within thirty ways may reply to such new
matter . . ." While this statute in terms provides only that the plaintiff may reply, it is
clear that the requirement is actually mandatory, Christofferson v. Wee, 24 N. D. 306, 139
NW. 689 (1913); N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0740 (1943), though a party may, by proceed-
ing at the trial on the assumption the allegations of the counterclaim are at issue, waive
the requirement. Power v. Bowdle, 3 N. D. 107, 54 N.W. 404 (1893).
73. N. D. Rev. Code k 28-0717 (1943). Under the present procedure, it may he
added, it would normally seem advisable for a pleader who has set forth new matter 4n
his answer and is not certain what contentions will be advanced in response to ask that
the court direct the adverse party to reply. Otherwise, under N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0740
(1943)Tevidence in denial or in confession and avoidance of the new matter may come in
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7(a) by the federal courts is followed here, there is ample warrant
for the statement that the existing practice as to replies will not be
substantially 4 changed. 75
C. Philosophy of Pleadings. It is nevertheless true that Rule 7(a)
was designed to discourage the use of pleadings bringing in new
averments after the complaint and answer have come into the
case. 71 In this respect it exemplifies in practice the entire philo-
sophy of pleading inherent in the new rules. The philosophy com-
mences with the assumption, persuasively supported by judge
Clark, 7 that as a normal matter it is useless to attempt to require a
pleader to particularize his case too definitely prior to the com-
mencement of proceedings. It follows from the assumption stated
that the pleadings should be limited in function to the accomplish-
ment of a few severely limited objectives: the giving of notice of
the general nature of the claim asserted,7 M the sufficient delineation
of the fact situation involved to permit the application of the doc-
trine of res judicata after the trial, 7 and the indication to the court
of the type of case presented so that it may be assigned the proper
form of trial.80 The pleader is not required to set forth the issues
at the trial, to the pleader's surprise and undoing. A number of cases illustrate the con-
sequences of this trap for the unwary. To controvert new matter contained in an answer, in
the absence of a reply limiting the scope of the issues which he can raise, a plaintiff may
show waiver and estoppel, Weber v. United Hardware and Implement Mutuals Co., 75 N.
D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456 (1948); Baird v. Kottke, 58 N. D. 846, 228 N.W. 214 (1929);
the statute of frauds, Wilson Co. v. Knowles, 52 N. D. 886, 204 N.W. 663 (1925); fraud,
Moores v. Tomlinson, 33 N. D. 638, 157 N.W. 685 (1916), and a written contract to
refute defendant's plea of breach of oral warranties, American Case & Register Co. v.
Walton & Davis Co., 22 N. D. 187, 133 N.W. 309 (1911). See N. D. R. Civ. P. 8(d),
infra, and discussion thereto. -
74. In some cases, it may be added, the plaintiff finds it desirable to make a :'eply
without being required to do so; and then it seems to be the consensus of opinion aiiong
counsel that leave of the court must he obtained beforehand. Porter v. Theo. J. Ely Mtg.
Co., 5 F. R. D. 317 (W. D. Pa. 1946); contra, Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assurance
Co., 1 F. R. D. 386 (W. D. Mo. 1940), app. dismissed, 127 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1942).
Compare N. D. R. Civ. P. 15 (Amended and Supplemental Pleadings).
75. Rule 7(a) has some other implications which deserve at least passing mention.
"The time of the closing of the pleadings becomes important not only in determining
whether further pleadings should, be filed but in deciding whether a demand for a jury
trial should be filed, whether, an adversary has waived his right to a jury trial by failing
to make a timely demand, whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings is in order, or
whether the case is at issue for trial." I Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
243 (Rules Ed. 1950).
76. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F. R. D. 456, 456-57 (1943).
77. Ibid.
78. "While pleadings are not and should not he an end in and of themselves, they
serve the important purpose of informing the adverse parties of the nature of the claim or
demand asserted and the relief demanded." I Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
Piocedure § 241 (Rules Ed. 1950). "The function of the complaint is to inform defendant
ot the nature of plaintiff's demand so that he may not he misled in the preparation of his
defense." Weber v. Lewis, 19 N. D. 473, 479, 126 N.W. 105, 107 (1910).
79. "As probably all will concede, there is a certain minimum which can be expucted
of pleadings. They must sufficiently differentiate the situation of fact which is being liti-
gated . . . to allow of the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . ." Clark, Simpli-
tied Pleading, 2 F. R. D. 456 (1943). See also Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today,
in Field Centenary Essays 55, 66 (1919), for a further discussion of Federal Rules plead-
ing in relation to Field Code pleading.
80. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F. R .D. 456, 457' (1943).
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and facts of the case in detailed form. For the formulation of issues
and the discovery and examination of the facts in the case on a
detailed basis, the Rules furnish the practitioner instead with far
more effective tools, the discovery, deposition, and pre-trial pro-
cedures prescribed, therein."
D. Motions. Rule 7(b.) expresses in succinct form a good deal
of law relating to orders and motions. Presumably it is to be read
in the light of the statutes it supersedes, which contain definitions
specifying precisely'vwhat actions on the part of the court constitute
"orders 1' 2 and what cobstitutes a "motion."'" At times the question
of when an order has been made can become important in deter-
mining the time limit for appeal." Similarly the question of when
an order is interlocutory or final in character can become important
iii determining whether a right of appeal exists. This last question
has recently received extensive treatment."
Motions, of course, are of great importance under the new Rules,
since they will hereafter perform the functions heretofore accomp-
lished through use of the demurrer,8" and may be used at the option
of the pleader as an alternative to the answer for the purpose of
81. "The pleading system adopted by the federal rules is designed to avoid to a great'
extent the terrors of' pleading by relegating the formal pleadings to the function of giving
notice of the matters in controversy and providing the improved procedures of deposition
and discovery, requests for admissions, summary judgment and pre-trial hearings to perform
the functions of fact-revelation and issue-formulation." 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedue 2 51 (Rules Ed. 1950). It would be unfair not to add one further
citation. For a rip-roaring and scholarly dissent from all of this, see McCaskill, Easj
Pleading, 35 I11. L. Rev. 28 (1940).82. N. D. Rev. Code J 28-2801 (1943) provides that "Every direction of a court or
judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an
order."
83. "An application for an order is a motion." N. D. Rev. Code J 28-2802 (1943).
84. In State v. Lindeman, 64 N. D. 518, 254 N.W. 276 (1934), it was held that an
oral order by a judge granting or denying a new trial was not complete for purposes of
starting the time for appeal to rnnning until it had been reduced to writing, signed by the
judge, and filed with the clerk of court. In State v. Wicks, 68 N. D. 1 276 N.W. 690
(1937), the Lindeman decision was supplemented by a further holding that mere entry of
the oral statement by the court upon the minutes of the court by the clerk does not com-
plete the order for this purpose. Thus, where a judge orally sustained a demurrer to a
criminal information on June 11, and signed the written order on September 16, the time
for appeal began running from September 16 even though the oral decision was entered
on the minutes by the clerk on June 11. These cases both involved criminal matters, but
the court utilized provisions of the' Code of Civil Procedure in its decisions on the ground
they were of a general nature and applied to criminal as well as civil matters.
8.5. Schaff v. Kennelly, 69 N.W.2d 777 (N. D. 1955), discussing the reviewable orders
statute, N. D. Rev. Code 0 28-0702 (1943). It should be noted that in some situations
even a paper denominated a "judgment" is in 'eality only an order. In Universal Motors
v. Coman, 73 N. D. 337, 15 N.W.2d 73 (1944), a district court granted a motion to
dismiss an appeal from justice court on the ground the appellant'had not posted an appeal
bond. Thereafter the court reversed itself without notice to either party and Vacated its
own order dismissing the appeal, entering a "judgment" reinstating the appeal. It was
held the party adversely affected could not appeal. The judgment was really an order, and
to perfect his right to appeal from it the party adversely affected should have moved to
vacate it, obtained a hearing on the motion, and appealed from the order entered after
hearing. The authority cited was N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0702 (7) (1943).
86. N. D. R. Civ. P. 7(c) and discussion thercto, infra.
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raising a number of procedural objections.8 7 Rules 7(b) (1) and
7(b) (2) relate primarily to form so far as motions are concerned;
for discussion of the substantive law surrounding individual types
of motions permitted by the new Rules the reader is referred to the
portions of this paper wherein the applicable sections of the Rules
are analyzed. 8
Rule 7(b) (3) continues the rule of a statutory provision which
has been little analyzed. Provisional remedies under the new Rules
include situations wherein the person of a litigant is seized or de-
tained,o injunctions, ' and attachment, garnishment, and similar
remedies. Rule 7(b) (3) indicates that matters involving such
remedies are quite properly to be given priority by the courts. In
this it is consistent with the statute relating to appeals, which allows
immediate appeals from orders granting, refusing, continuing, or
modifying provisional remedies and injunctions before a final judg-
ment has been entered,'" thus indicating a similar policy of priority
ot the appellate level.
E. Abolition of Demurrers, Etc. Rule 7(c) works the first of the
great changes in the law of pleading accomplished by the new
rules. It abolishes demurrers to complaints and answers, long a
familiar feature of Field Code and common law procedures, and
replaces them with the more convenient and flexible remedy of the
motion.
Under the Code there are six grounds upon which a defendant
may demur to a complaint. These are (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject of the action, (3) lack of capacity on the part of the plaintiff
to sue, (4) that another action is pending between the parties in-
volving the same cause, (5) that there has been improper joinder
of causes of action, and (6) that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action."
These various grounds are treated in the new rules as follows:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over
the subject matter of the action may be either pleaded in thc
answer or raised by motion at the option of the pleader;9 3 (2) lack
87. N. D. R. Civ P. 12(b) and discussion thereto, infra.
88. See discussion infro relating to N. D. R. Civ. P. 7(c), 12(b) (c) (e) and (f), etc.
89. N. D. R. Civ. P. 84.
90. N. D. R. Civ. P. 65.
91. N. D. Rev. Code 1 28-0702 (3) (1943). See discussion in Note, 28 N. Dak.
L. Rev. 186, 194-95 (1952).
92. N. D. Rev. Code # 28-0706 (1943).
93. N. D. Civ. P. 12(b).
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of capacity to sue must be specially pleaded in the answer; "4 (3)
the defense that another action is pending would seem to be ap-
propriately taken by answer, motion for judgment on the pleadings,
or motion for summary judgment;" (4) the defense of improper
joinder of causes of action is no longer permitted;"; and (5) the
objection that the complaint fails to state a cause of action may
now be raised by motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted," motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, 8 motion for summary judgment,19 or by objection to the ad-
mission of evidence at the trial. 99"
While the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted is also discussed under Rule 12(b),
some attention might well be paid to it at this point, since it illus-
trates very effectively the flexibility of the new rules.
In the normal case, this motion performs precisely the same
function as the demurrer.' It tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint by accepting the allegations made in the complaint at
face value and then raising the issue whether the complaiit suffi-
ciently sets forth a breach of duty and a resulting right to relief in
the complainant." '
But there are numerous cases in which the complaint may be
technically sufficient and yet factually insufficient. Under the Code
procedure a demurrer which attempted to assert the existence of
this situation by setting up matter outside the complaint was con-
sidered bad on its face. The so-called "speaking" demurrer was not
permitted.' . When the Federal Rules were first adopted, some of
the federal judges showed a strong tendency to apply precisely the
same restriction to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.1"1" Subsequent amendments to the rules, however, made it
abundantly clear that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted may be supported by matters
94. N. D. R. Civ. P. 9(a).
95. Equally, of course, the other action might be consolidated with the action wherein
the objection is raised.
96. N. D. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
97. N. D. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
98. N. D. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
99. N. D. R. Civ. P. 56.
99a. See N. D. R. Civ. P. 12(h), and discussion thereto, infra, note 243.
100. 1 Barron-& Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure J 246 (Rules Ed. 1950).
101. Tahir Erk v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 116 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1941); Leimer v.
State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940); Smith v. Blackwell, 34
F. Supp. 989 (E. D. S. C. 1940).
102. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 182 N. C. 166, 108 S.E. 500 (1921).
103. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 1 246 (Rules Ed. 1950).
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outside the pleading, such as affidavits."" When this is done, the
motion is treated as having been transformed into one for summary
judgment under Rule 56 and the parties are given a "reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion
by Rule 56."'"'  It is plain, therefore, that the motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted can
readily be used as a sort of "speaking" demurrer, whenever it be-
comes desirable from a procedural standpoint.
RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADING
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he
deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded.'"
A. The Complaint. At first glance, Rule 8(a) would appear to
work a radical and sweeping. change in the pleading law of North
Dakota regarding complaints and similar pleadings. The Code
presently provides that a complaint shall contain a "plain and con-
cise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action."' 17 Both
the italicized provisions are conspicuous by their absence from
Rule 8(a), having been deliberately omitted. On their face these
alterations would seem to cut extremely deep, leaving the pleader
adrift on a sea of uncertainty as to what his complaint should
contain.
It becames instantly obvious, however, when one undertakes to
investigate the matter, that the change is in most respects more ap-
104. Thus, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(hs) was amended to provide as follows: "If, on a motion
. to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can he
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded hy the court, the
motion shall he treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 'reasonaule opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." This provision is incorporated in the North
Dakota Rules.
10.5. See not 104, supra.
106. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The superseded statutory pro-
visions are N. D. Rev. Code §§ 28-0702, 28-0731, 28-0729 and 28-0701 (1943). The
text of N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0702 (1943) may well be set forth here for purposes of
comparison. It reads as follows:
"Complaints; What to Contain. The first pleadings on the part of the plaintiff is the
complaint. The complaint shall contain:
1. The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court and county in which the
action is brought, and the names of the parties to the action, plainstiff and defendant;
2. A plain concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action without un-
necessary repetition; and
3. A demand for the relief to which the plaintiff claims t) be entitled. If th. re-
covery of money is demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated."
107. See note 106, supra.
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parent than real. Further, it is equally obvious that the change is
emphatically one for the better. As the -sample complaints set forth
in the appendix to the rules illustrate, the end result of Rule 8(a)
is a system of rules regarding complaints as simple, modern, ad-
vanced, and free from useless technicalities as any that has yet
been devised.
B. Status of Fact Pleading. It is probably simplest to commence
by directing attention to the effects of the elimination of the re-
quirement that only facts may be set forth. in the complaint. As
noted above, the Code. makes this requirement in express terms.
The case law interpreting this requirement of fact pleading has
amplified it into the statement that the complaint should contain
the "ultimate facts" of the case as distinguished from "evidentiary
facts" on the one hande 8 and "conclusions of law"'1 9 on the other.
This is familiar law in-all Code states. However, when the rule is
examined in the light of the cases, it is evident that its application
is tempered by other considerations, chief among which are pro-
cedural effectiveness and simplicity. The North Dakota Court has.
a fine history of having interpreted the fact pleading requirement
to achieve precisely these ends.
Thus, an obvious point, it has long used the fact pleading re-
quirement for the purpose of overruling objections to pleadings
based on the proposition that a specific legal theory should be
stated in them. If the facts pleaded show any basis of recovery, the
court has uniformly upheld the pleading-as sufficient to bring that
theory into the case.1"' On occasion the court has gone even further
sustaining complaints which scarcely did more than notify the ad-
verse party of the general transaction from which the claim of the
plaintiff arose,"' a result plainly anticipating the Federal Rules.
108. It is, of course, much less serious to plead too much in the way of facts-than to
plead too. little. Where the court has been willing to uphold a complaint as pleading the
ultimate facts, it has usually stated that additional averments of fact in the complaint would
have merely been "evideniary." Golly v: Kiner, 50 N. D. 800, 804, 197 N.W. 883, 885
(1924); Seckerson v. Sinclair, 24 N. D. 625, 627, 140 N.W. 239, 241 (1913).
109. Hart v. Hone, 57 N. D. .590, 223 N.W. 346 (1929); Security National Bank v.
Dougherty, 63 N. D. 1, 204 N.W. 847 (1925); Bergen Township v. Nelson County, 33
N. D. 247, 156 N.W. 559 (1916); Houghton Implement Co. v. Vavorosky, 15 N. D. 308.
109 N.W. 1024 (1906); Van Dyke v. Doherty, 6 N. D. 263, 69 NW. 200 (1896). In all
the foregoing cases, pleadings were held bad as alleging mere conclusions of law.
110. Thus, see Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916) (complaint in
action for alienation of affections held sufficient to permit plaintiff to recover for criminal
conversation); Logan v. Freerks, 14 N. D. 127, 103 N.W. 426 (1905) (action for con-
version of money, complaint -held sufficient to state cause of action for money had and
received); Miller v. National Elevator Co., 32 N. D. 352, 155 N.W. 871 (1915) (com-
plaint failing to state causo of action in trover was valid as pleading cause of action for
trespass on the case).
11. Peterson v. Swanson, 39 N. D. 301, 167 N.W. 389 (1918); Weber v. Lewis, 19
N. D. 473, 126 N.V. 105 (1910).
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Thus, in Weber v. Lewis' l2 it upheld a complaint which alleged
merely, after some preliminary recitations, "that by reason of the
rental of the said land, and the work performed by this defendant,
and the use of this plaintiff's machinery, and the sale of cattle be-
longing to this plaintiff and the defendant jointly, by the defendant,
and the storing of grain of defendant by plaintiff, and for the fur-
nishing of twine, this defendant is indebted to this plaintiff in the
sum of $454.40 . . ." The court ruled that the complaint was
sustainable as constituting a common count in indebitatus assump-
sit at common law, '" and added some extremely modem views on
the subject of pleading: "The function of the complaint is to in-
form defendant of the nature of plaintiff's demand so that he may
not be misled in the preparation of his defense. If the complaint
does this in a general way, it is sufficient as against an attack by
demurrer, although inartifically drawn."',
It is quite plain that the spirit of the new rules is precisely to
the same, effect. Thus, in contract cases, the forms prescribed by
the new rules follow the general pattern of the complaint in Weber
v. Lewis in an even more simple fashion. Form 3, for example,
alleges merely that "Defendant owes plaintiff one thousand dollars
according to the account hereto annexed as Exhibit 1." Form 4
states simply that "Defendant owes plaintiff one thousand dollars
for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between June
1, 1953, and December 1, 1958," and yet is sufficient to state a claim
for goods sold and delivered. Form 5, a complaint for money lent,
alleges simply that "Defendant owes plaintiff one thousand dollars
for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June 1, 1953." Striking
though the simplicity of these sample complaints may be, they
nevertheless are merely advanced versions of what the North
Dakota Court has already upheld.
What is true in contract cases is equally true in tort cases, where
the same spirit of allowing broadly-phrased allegations has pre-
112. 19 N. D. 473, 126 N.W. 105 (1910).
113. As to the propriety of the holding in Weber v. Lewis, supra, and Jones v. Great
Northern Ry., cited infra in the text, note the following language in Clark, Code Pleading
and Practice Today, Field Centenary Essays 55 66 (1949): "With respect to pleading
proper, the federal system now emphasizes the statement of the party's claim without
stress upon the facts as such. Thus it serves to bring the Field Code down to date by
doing away with the required allegation of a mass of detail as to the occasion for suit.
True, the Field Code did in form require the pleading of facts; but in its concurrent re-
quirement of simplicity and conciseness, and its acceptance - as most courts generally
agreed - of the customary general allegations of the common law as to negligence in
trespass on the case and contract and debt claims in the common counts in assumpsit show
that no such fine spinning of details was originally intended as developed in many codes."
114. Weber v. Lewis, 19 N. D. 473, 479, 126 N.W. 105, 107 (1910). In this case,
incidentally, a strong dissenting opinion argued that the complaint did not olead facts but
legal conclusions, and hence was invalid.
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vailed. In Jones v. Great Northern Ry."15 the Court held sufficient
a complaint which alleged that the defendant, in operating a train,
'negligently and carelessly and wrongfully struck and killed a
certain heifer then and there the property of plaintiffs, of the value,"
etc., against an attack based on the proposition the circumstances
constituting negligence should have been fully set forth. Stating
that the allegation was sufficient as a statement of mixed law and
fact, the Court added that "Some latitude must be given the term
'facts' when used in a rule of pleading.",t The Joint Committee has
annexed to the text of the rules a sample complaint for negligence
utilizing precisely this same principle:
FORM 8. COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE
"1. On June 1, 1953, in a public highwhy called Thayer Avenue,
in Bismarck, North Dakota, defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.
"2. As a result, plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg
broken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting
his business, suffered great pain of body and mind, and incurred
expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of
one thousand dollars.
"Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the
sum of ten thousand dollars and costs."
This complaint actually ought to be sufficient under the present
rule as illustrated by Jones v. Great Northern Ry., supra. Yet it
should be emphasized that by allowing such simple and direct
allegations, the Rules in no way detract from the protection afford-
ed to defendants. As pointed out previously, the discovery pro-
cedures under the new rules furnish the defendants in such actions
with even more effective tools than they possessed in the past for
the purpose of examining the basis of the case against them.
115. 12 N. D. 343, 97 N.W. 353 (1903). Cf. Seckerson v. Sinclair, 24 N. D. 625, 140
N.W. 239 (1913).
116. 'It is, of course, an elementary rule of pleading, that facts, and not mere con-
clusions of law, are to be pleaded. But this rule does not limit the pleader to the state-
ment of pure matters of fact, unmixed with any matter of law. When a pleader alleges
title to or ownership of property, or the execution of a deed in the usual form, these are
not statements of pure fact. They are all conclusions from certain probative or evidential
facts not stated. They are in part conclusions of law and in part statements of facts, or,
rather, the ultimate facts drawn from these probative or evidential facts not stated; yet
these forms are universally held to be good pleading. Some latitude must therefore he given
to the term 'facts,' when used in a rule of pleading. It must of necessity include many
allegations which are mixed conclusions of law and statements of fact; otherwise plead-
ings would become intolerably prolix, and mere statements of the evidence. Hence it has
become a rule of pleading that while it is not allowable to allege a mere conclusion of law,
containing no element of fact, yet it is proper not only to plead the ultimate fact infer-
able from certain other facts, but also to plead anything which according to the common
and ordinary use of language amounts to a mixed statement of fact and a legal conclu-
sion." Jones v. Great Northern Ry., 12 N. D. 343, 346-47, 97 N.W. 535, .536 (1903).
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One could go on to cite instances where the Court has given a
thoroughly relaxed and reasonable interpretation of the require-
nient of fact pleading at some length. Thus it has often cheerfully
disregarded allegations in a complaint inconsistent with the claim
the plaintiff actually advanced at the trial of the cause. In Johnson
Farm Investment Co. v. Huff,'", it treated as surplusage an allega-
tion that the plaintiff had declared due the unpaid balance on a
contract for the purchase of land where the general tenor of the
complaint clearly indicated the objective of the action was to can-
cel the contract rather than affirm it and claim relief thereunder.
In Logan v. Freerks' where a complaint alleged that the defend-
ants had received money, and "converted the same to their own
use," it was held that the plaintiff could recover on a theory of
quasi-contract, the allegation as to conversion being mere surplu-
sage. But there is little to be gained from such an enumeration.
While there are, of course, instances in which the Court has rejected
complaints as legally insufficient for failure to plead the ultimate
facts in a case, " it is plain that as a general matter the requirement
of fact pleading has been given a distinctly pragmatic and effective
treatment in this jurisdiction. The "fine spinning of details"'121 so
greatly objected to in many Code jurisdictions has not ordinarily
been demanded of pleaders here.
The simple allegations permitted in contract actions are perhaps
the most dramatic illustrations of the permissible simplicity in
pleading under the new rules. They represent, of course, essentially
i modernization of the old common count pleading permitted under
the pre-Code and Code procedures, wherein the pleader basically
did little more than tender an issue. In terms of the tort cases and
most other areas, somewhat greater detail as to the case is required,
a.-, illustrated by the sample complaint for negligence set forth
above. As to cases of this sort, what the new rules require may be
accurately termed a "modified" sort of fact pleading.'2 ' One must
still indicate in a general way the facts involved in the case; the
idea that the rules provide for pure and simple "notice" pleading is
117. 52 N. D. .589, 204 N.W. 333 (1925).
118. 14 N. D. 127, 103 N.W. 426 (1905).
119. Eberlien v. Guarantee Fund Life Association, 58 N. D. 617, 226 N.W. 810 (1929)
(complaint in action on life insurance contract held insufficient for failure to state provis-
ion of contract upon which plaintiff's right depended).
120. Clark, supra, note 113.
121. "This theory of notice pleading, while it has not been rejected, has been modified
to the extent that pleading under the Rules constitutes something mnre than mere notice
and yet something less than fact pleading." Note, The Complaint Under the Fedearl Rules
ot Procedure, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 252, 257, n. 34 (1941).
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somewhat too sweeping to be accurate.' " The improvement in the
new rules lies not in switching from fact to notice pleading but in
the elimination of arguments over what is an "ultimate fact" and
what is a "conclusion of law." 2: Under the new rules it makes very
little difference how one views a particular allegation. If the whole
pleading sufficiently indicates a fact situation in which a breach of
a duty owed the plaintiff appears, with a resulting claim to relief
which seems legally justified, then it passes the test of the new
rules whether some of its allegations amount to conclusions or not.
In terms of the requirement of fact pleading, this is the extent of the
change contemplated by the new rules. In the end a residual




Generally speaking it may be said that any pleading sufficient
under the Code will be sufficient under the new rules. What is
good craftsmanship under the one is good craftsmanship under the
other.
C. The "Claim" Compared to the "Cause of Action." Despite the
fact they are closely related, the "claim" under the new rules and
the "cause of action" under the Code are not formally identical con-
cepts. The framers of the Federal Rules used the term "claim" in
place of "cause of action" advisedly, meaning thereby to achieve
a definite result.
122. The following extracts from Church, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Pleadings,
Motions, Parties and Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F. R. D. 315, 316-17 (1940), indicates the
true situation:
"In the course of his address at Cleveland, Judge Clark . . . was asked this question:
'Isn't a distinction as to pleading only the ultimate facts to be perpetuated under the new
rules?' to which he replied: 'Not in the sense of making the judge formally decide that
the pleading states only ultimate facts and that everything else is erroneous. In the sense
that good pleading would call for you to state those more general facts, yes.'
"At the Washington Institute he was asked: 'Do you consider that Rule 7 abolishes the
rule that, in considering motions to strike a pleading for insufficiency to state a cause of
action, allegations of legal conclusions shall he disregarded?' to which he replied: 'Well,
om that I know there is a lot of opinion about the difference between legal conclusions and
something else. There is supposed to he a difference between legal conclusions and ulti-
mate facts and evidential facts. I never could see much difference, except one of degree.
I suppose the way to answer your question is to say that in general, sound rules of plead-
ing are not greatly changed, and so far as yon haven't stated any basis of facts at all, you
wouldn't get any relief. When I say sound rules of pleading, however I am thinking more
of such pleading as was allowed in trespass on the caes or assumpsit than of involved and
detailed allegations. Yes, we disregard legal conclusions within some limits, if they are
legal conclusions, I suppose. I don't believe there is as much chance to quibble over
these things as there was, but you would have to have at least some allegations of fact."
See also the same discussion at 1 F. R. D. 317-18.
123. As indicating how much time can he spent, and how involved the arguments can
get, over the difference (if any) between allegations of ultimate facts and assertions of
conclusions of law, see Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 Col.
L. Rev. 416 (1921); Wheaton, Manner of Stating a Cause of Action, 20 Corn. L. Q. 185
f 1935) (disagreeing with Professor Cook's conclusion that it is impossible to distinguish
between the two, but agreeing that to require the distinction to he drawn in pleadings is a
ssaste of time and effort); Cavit, Legal Conclusions, 9 Ind. L. J. 109 (1933).
124. See note 122, supro.
[VOL. 33
PROPOSED N. D. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 8
The framers of the Federal Rules were, of course, establishing
a procedure for use in courts throughout the United States. A factor
influencing them in their decision not to use the term "cause of
action" was that the term had been subjected to varying interpreta-
tions from state to state and hence meant different things to practi-
tioners in different jurisdictions.
Judge Clark listed three separate interpretations of the phrase in
his text on Code Pleading. In substance, these were that a cause
action was (1) the equivalent of a legal right of action; (2) that it
was the factual transaction out of which the right of action arose,
but nevertheless limited by such right or rights of action; and (3)
that it was the factual transaction itself, the occurrence involved in
the suit, viewed as a unit of facts and differentiated from other
events or occurrences pretty much as a layman might differentiate
one happening from another. 12' There are substantial differences
in result following from these different interpretations, as will be
very apparent in the material immediately following, but it should
be added here that in all probability the three definitions listed
above may be accurately reduced to two. This is for the reason that
courts utilizing the second view above normally reach results
achieved under the third view, and the difference between them
seems to be essentially semantic rather than substantive.
Differences in result appear instantly when one considers these
divergent points of view in the context of particular situations. To
illustrate, assume a case where A and B are involved in an auto-
mobile accident wherein* A's vehicle is badly damaged and A him-
self sustains serious personal injuries. A plainly has a right of action
for damage to his property and also a right of action for damages to
his person. Does he have one or two causes of action? In a juris-
diction following the first view mentioned above, A may bring two
separate and successive suits against B, one for injury to property
and another for injury to person. In a jurisdiction following the
third view, A must present both claims to the court in the same pro-
ceeding. This is on the ground that the accident itself constituted
a single cause of action which necessarily must be vindicated in a
single proceeding; to allow A to maintain two suits would be to
allow him to split one cause of action into two lawsuits.121
125. Clark, Code Pleading 310-31 (2d ed. 1947).
126. Compare King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W. 1113 (1900),
with Ochs v. Public Service By.. 81 N. J. Law 661, 80 Ati. 495 (1911), squarely pre-
senting the divergent points of view. For discussion, see Hinton, Splitting Causes of Action
Jor Injuries to Person and Property Resulting From Same Act, 21 11. L. Rev. 506 (1927);
Rossman, Joinder')of Causes of Action, 2 Ore. L. Rev. 106 (1922); Note, 2 Wash. L.
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The difference between these interpretations of the term "cause
of action" is also reflected in the formal organization of the plead-
ings, since causes of action must be separately stated. To illustrate,
in a jurisdiction following the first view stated above, if A and B
engage in an altercation where B both assaults A physically and
slanders him, A's complaint will contain two separate counts, one
for battery and another for defamation. In a jurisdiction following
the third view, A's complaint ought to contain only a single count,
since only a single cause of action is present. 11
Still another area where the divergence in interpretation of the
term is important is in the law surrounding joinder of causes of
action in a single complaint. Jurisdictions taking the first view of
what constitutes a cause of action tend to take a narrow view of
what constitutes a "transaction" for purposes of joinder. ' Hence
it has actually been held in at least one jurisdiction that a cause
oi action for battery and a cause of action for defamation could not
be joined in a single complaint because they did not rise out of the
same transaction, even though the defamation and the battery
occurred at the same time.'2 5 Of course, by virtue of the broad
provisions of the new rules relating to joinder of claims, this last
question will soon be academic.
In any event, it was the intention of the framers of the Federal
Rules to adopt, in substance, the third view as to the "cause of
action."'' Consequently this view will also become the rule for the
North Dakota courts. Fortunately, the cases indicate that the North
Dakota Supreme Court has already been proceeding on substan-
tially this interpretation. In Pipan v. Aetna Insurance Co.'" it used
language equating the concept of "cause of action" with the term
Rev. 48 (1926). The nearest the North Dakota Court has come to deciding this precise
question seems to be Anderson v. Jacobson, 42 N. D. 87, 172 N.W. 64 (1919), citing the
Knig case, supra, in inconclusive fashion.
127. Pipan v. Aetna Insurance Co., 58 N. D. 435, 226 N.W. 498 (1929).
128. The Code allows joinder of causes of action arising out "the same transaction."
N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0703 (1943). This language, of co)urse, implies that a cause of
action is something other than the transaction from which it arises. Converesly, the Code
also refers to the "facts constituting the cause of action," N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0702
(1943), a phrase equating the cause of action with the factual transaction on which the
suit is based. The inconsistency between these two provisions has been the subject of much
debate among writers on the subject. It is not proposed to explore that debate here.
129. De Wolfe v. Abraham, 151 N. Y. 186, 45 N.E. 455 (1896); contra, Harris v.
Avery, 5 Kan. 146 (1869).
130. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Proce'dur. § 255 (Rules Ed. 1950);
Clark, J., concurring in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyu Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
41939).
131. 58 N. D. 435, 226 N.W. 498 (1929).
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"transaction"32 for the purpose of determining whether it was
proper to have one or two counts in a complaint. In Meske v.
Melicheraa it treated the factual transaction between the parties as
equivalent to the cause of action for the purpose of applying the
rule against splitting causes of action. And every case wherein it
has held that a complaint defective on one theory was nevertheless
good on another may be cited for the implicit proposition that the
cause of action is the factual event or transaction in issue, rather
than the various legal rights arising out of that transaction." '
The shift from pleadings asserting causes of action to pleadings
asserting claims will therefore cause little difficulty in this state.
D. The Prayer for Relief. So far as the prayer for relief is con-
cerned, the present law of North Dakota may be summarily stated.
The prayer for relief does not constitute a part of the substantive
cause of action set forth in the complaint and its averments in no
way limit the pleader in his proof of the cause of action or in the
theory of the case adopted at the trial.' The same thing is true
under the new rules.
:' a
(b) Defenses: Form of Denials. A party shall state in short
and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends
in good faith to deny only a part or a qualfication of an aver-
132. "The two causes of action set forth in plaintiff's complaint are founded upon the
same transaction. Instead of being a statement of two separate causes of action, it is a
statement of a single cause of action in different forms. There is but one primary right
involved-the right to recover on an alleged single contract of insurance." Id. at 441,
226 N.W. at 500.
133. 49 N. D. 1160, 194 N.W. 737 (1923).
134. E.g., Johnson Farm Investment Co. v. Huff, 52 N. D. 589, 204 N.W. 333 (1925);
Rott v. Goehring, 33 N. D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916); Miller v. National Elevator Co., 32
N. D. 352, 155 N.W. 871 (1915); Logan v. Freerks, 14 N. D. 127, 103 N.W. 426
(1905). Redlinger & Hanson v. Parker, 62 N. D. 483, 243 N.W. 792 (1932), was a
situation wherein the Supreme Court upheld the action of a trial court requiring a plain-
tilf to choose between a count pleading an express contract and a count pleading a claim in
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of labor and services rendered in erecting a build-
ing. Clearly the court did not feel it was compelling the plaintiff to sacrifice a cause of
action; it treated the cause of action as distinctly separate from the legal rights of re-
covery asserted.
135. State ex rel. Coan v. Plaza Equity Elevator Co., 65 N. D. 658, 261 N.W. 46
(1935); Jacobson v. Horner, 49 N. D. 741, 193 N.W. 327 (1923); State Bank v. Nelson,
48 N. D. 702, 186 N.W. 766 (1922); Guild v. More, 32 N. D. 432, 155 N.W. (1915).
See also N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2004 (1943): "The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there
is no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in
any other case the court may grant him relief consistent with the case made by the com-
plaint and embraced within the issue." To entitle a plaintiff to an injunction pendente
lite restraining the defendant, it must appear from the facts stated in the complaint that
plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, and it must be demanded in the prayer for relief.
Forman v. Healey, 11 N. D. 563, 93 N.W. 866 (1903).
136. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 276 (Rules Ed. 1950).
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ment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in
good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding
pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials of desig-
nated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all
the averments except such designated averments or paragraphs
as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to contro-
vert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to
the obligations set forth in Rule 11.137
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmative accord and satis-
faction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure
of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mis-
takenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counter-
claim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designa-
tion. 1
3 8
(d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to
the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no re-
sponsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.1
3 9
(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise
and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are re-
quired. " '
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them
if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the al-
ternative statements. A party may also state as many separate
claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 11.141
137. This is taken witho,,t chaniz- from the Federal Rules. The sunerseded statutory
provisions are N. D. Rev. Codp. 11 28-0710 (1), 28-0715, 28-0732 and 28-0733 (1943).
138. This is taken without change from the Federal Rules. The superseded statutory pro-
visions are N. D. Rev. Code §§ 28-0710 (2). and 28-0729 (1943).
139. This is taken without change from the Federal Rules. The superseded statutory
provision is N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0740 (1943).
140. This is taken directly from the Federal Rules. The superseded statutory provision
is N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0702 (1943).
141. This is taken without change from the Federal Rules. It constitutes new matter
in North Dakota law and is not listed by the Joint Committee as superseding any North
Dakota statutory provisions.
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(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice.
14 2
A. The Answer Under the New Rules. Most of the provisions of
Rule 8 subsequent to paragraph 8(a) deal with the answer. For
that reason, consideration of convenience have indicated that they
be considered together. In the commentary to Rule 8(a), the gen-
eral rules applicable to the complaint were briefly explored. The
answer plainly merits a similar treatment.
In general it may be said that the answer known and used tinder
the Field Code survives with only minor changes under the new
rules. The strict requirement of fact pleading has, of course, been
relaxed in precisely the same fashion with regard to the answer as
with regard to the complaint." Placing that change - essentially
-- difference of degree - to one side, the major differences between
the Code and the Rules with regard to the answer are two: (1)
the Rules are more detailed; (2) they permit alternative and hy-
pothetical averments in the answer, as they also do in the com-
plaint.
It is probably true that the answer must be, inherently and by
the very nature of its function, a somewhat more complex instru-
ment than the complaint. The writer has previously undertaken
some discussion of the common-law background and historical
development which led to the enactment of the present Code pro-
visions,"' and no repetition of what has already been said will be
attempted here. But considering the instrument in terms of its
function, it is fundamental that the answer must respond to an
instrument showing a prima facie case in the adverse party by es-
tablishing an equally valid prima facie case in favor of the defend-
ant; and this it must necessarily do in one or more of several dif-
ferent fashions.
Any defense pleaded in an answer necessarily falls into one of
two broad general categories. It is either a plea in bar, striking at
the substantive foundation of the plaintiff's case, or a plea in abate-
ment striking at the procedural right to maintain the action by ob-
jecting to the time when it is brought,"' or the particular forum, 8
142. This is taken verbatim from the Federal Rules. Superseded statutory provisions are
N. D. Rev. Code §i 28-0741 and 28-0742 (1943).
143. See comment to Rule 8(a), supra.
144. Crum, Scope of the General Denial, 27 N. Dak. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
145. E. g., one takes advantage of the fact that the complaint in a divorce action has
not been a bona fide resident of the state for one year-by plea in abatement. Dutcher v.
Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 (1876).
146. A good illustration would be an.allegation that an action brought in a county court
of increased jurisdiction in this state should have been commenced in the district court.
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or the plaintiff's capacity to sue,1'1 or similar matters of the same
general type.
The process of categorization does not stop there. When a given
defense is classified as sounding in abatement, the consequence
follows that it must be set up specially.' It cannot be proved
under some form of plea in bar- notably the general denial in
most cases -for the reason that to permit it to be proved under
such a substantive plea would make the subsequent judgment res
judicata on the merits when no substantive defense had in fact
been established.19  Equally, when a given defense is classified as
a plea in bar, the conventional usage - sanctioned in the new rules
- assigns it to one of two further broad general classes. The re-
sulting dichotomy may be expressed substantially as follows:
A plea in bar either
1. Denies that the plaintiff ever had a claim or cause of action
and for the purpose of substantiating the plea
(a) entitles the pleader to directly disprove the allegations
of the opposing complaint, or
(b) entitles the pleader to indirectly disprove the allega-
tions of the opposing complaint by proving that other facts
inconsistent with those allegations are true, or
2. Confesses that the plaintiff once had a claim or cause of
action and avoids the effect of the admission by setting forth ad-
ditional matter to show that the claim or cause of action no
longer exists.' 5"
The foregoing views as to the distinction between matter in de-
nial and matter in confession and avoidance are sanctioned by
many North Dakota decisions," ' and would appear to be continued
147. Such as the plea that the plaintiff is not a corporation. Stange v. Price, 191 Ky.
734, 231 S.W. 532 (1921). Note that this sort of plea must also be set out specially
by express provision of the new rules. N. D. R. Civ. P. 9(a).
148. Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 (1876); Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial
Rights J 698 (2n ed. 1883).
149. "A general denial is a plea in bar, not broader at least than the general denial at
common law, and cannot raise any defense by way of abatement . . . Judgment for the
defendant upon a general denial is a general judgment: a bar to all future actions upon
the same cause. And it would be a cruel abuse that it should go upon a defense in
abatement, concealed in germio. The code intended no such perversion of justice." Dutcher
v. Dutcher, supra. note 148. This is the accepted reasoning. It no longer seems particularly
valid in a day when it is relatively easy to look behind the face of the judgment to ascer-
tain on what basis a court acted; but the law seems established.
150. Compare with this classification the material in Pomeroy, supra. note 148, at
644; Thyson, The General Denial in Missouri, 26 Wash. U. L. Q. 298 (1941).
151. E.g., Vallancey v. Hunt, 20 N. D. 579, 129 N.W. 455 (1910); First State Bank
v. Radke, 51 N. D. 246, 199 N.W. 930 (1924); Hansboro State Bank v. Imperial Elevator
Co., 46 N. D. 363, 179 N.W. 669 (1920); Anderson Mercantile Co. v. Anderson, 22 N. D.
441, 134 N.W. 36 (1911); Hogen v. Klabo. 13 N. D. 319, 100 N.W. 847 (1904). See
also discussion in the article cited in footnote 144, supra. Vallancey v. Hunt, supra, should
he considered in the light of Piano Mfg. Co. v. Daly, 6 N. D. 330, 70 N.W. 277 (1897).
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without change in the new rules. It would be noted that a very
considerable possibility of confusion exists between those types of
defenses admissible as tending to show that a plaintiff never had a
cause of action under praragraph 1(b) of the foregoing dichotomy
and those defenses which confess and avoid. This is because
evidence of the sort contemplated in paragraph 1 (b), above, is in
one sense affirmative and nevertheless tends ultimately only to
prove that the plaintiff never had a cause of action. 12 The practi-
cal consequences are illustrated by such cases as Hogen v. Klabo,'
5 "
3
and Anderson Mercantile Co. v. Anderson,151 in both of which the
Court allowed a defendant to disprove an allegation he was liable
on a specific contract by submitting affirmative evidence to show
that a different contract having different terms was in fact made by
the parties.
Rule 8(c) simplifies the law surrounding defenses in confession
and avoidance rather considerably by specifically enumerating nine-
teen separate affirmative defenses which must be specially pleaded.
So far as this writer's research has disclosed, the North Dakota
court has reached substantially the same result with regard to most
of the defenses listed. A possible exception is Hughes v. Wachter,5,
dealing with the defense of payment. In that case the Court held
that where the complaint alleged non-payment of an obligation, the
defense of payment was provable under a denial, on the ground
that the issue of payment was formally in the case by reason of the
allegation and the traverse.1" '; Apparently the intent of the new
rules is in the other direction, and it will be interesting to observe





152. "Evidence in its nature affirmative is often confounded with defenses which are
essentially affirmative and in avoidance of the plaintiff's cause of action, and is therefore
mistakenly regarded as new matter requiring to he specially pleaded, although its effect
upon the issues is strictly negative, and it is entirely admissible under an answer of denial.
In other words, in order that evidence may be proved under a denial, it need not he in
its own nature negative; affirmative evidence may often be used to contradict an allegation
in the complaint, and may therefore be proved to maintain the negative issue raised by the
defendant's denials." Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights § 671 (2d ed. 1883).
153. 13 N. D. 319, 100 N.W. 847 (1904).
154. 22 N. D. 441, 314 N.W. 36 (1911).
155. 61 N. D. 513, 238 N.W. 776 (1931). Accord, Tolerton & W. Co. v. Suit, 33 N.
D. 283, 156 N.W. 838 (1916). But see Robertson Lumber Co. v. State Bank of Edin-
burg, 14 N. D. 511, 516, 105 N.W. 719, 720 (1905); Gans v. Beasley, 4 N. D. 140,
155, 59 N.W. 714, 719 (1894).
156. The decision is criticized in 31 Mich. L. Rev. 132 (1932); but see Reppy, The
Anomaly of Payment as an Affirmative Defense, 10 Corn. L. Q. 269 (1925).
15. Equally, it will be interesting to observe whether the court will allow fraud in the
the execution of an instrument, as distinguished from fraud in the inducement or treaty,
to be raised under a denial in the face of Rule 8(c), which states simply that "fraud"
must be affirmatively set forth. Proof of one sort of fraud is really proof that an instru-
men was never executed at all. Proof of the other sort confesses and avoids the instru-
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B. Effect of Failure to Deny. Rule 8(d) continues in force a
well-established rule of pleading in this state, since its statement
that averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is re-
quired, other than those as to the amount of damages, ' are ad-
mitted when not denied in the responsive pleading is almost a
paraphrase of the existing statute.'"" The second sentence of the
rule - "Averments in a pleading to which no. responsive pleading is
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided" - also
accords with existing law; ' but the attention of the reader is di-
rected to the fact that this seemingly innocuous provision in reality
aliows matter in confession and avoidance to be, at times, introduc-
ed into a case without being pleaded beforehand, a situation which
has at times proved disastrous for unwary defendants." '
C. Alternative, Hypothetical, and Inconsistent Allegations. Rule
8(e) (2) allows a pleader to set up either alternative, hypothetical
or inconsistent allegations in his complaint or answer, subject to an
ethical obligation of good faith imposed by Rule 11. As to incon-
sistent allegations in an answer, this is already the law of North
Dakota, established by a firm, broadly-phrased, and square hold-
ing." 2 In other respects the rule is new. It is, of course, designed
to allow the pleader to meet the situation where he cannot be com-
pletely certain what the proof will show- a situation not un-
familiar to many advocates. The rule of the Code is otherwise, but
this provision of the new rules must nevertheless be regarded as an
important improvement and a distinct convenience."" Does it, in
any way, handicap the opposing pleader? The answer is in the
negative. So long as the pleading gives fair notice of the general
situation to be litigated, it serves its purpose.'"
RULE 9. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
(a) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party. When a
ment. See Clark, Code Pleading 617 (2d ed. 1947). But the answer would seem to be
indicated by Rule 9(b), infra.
158. In accord as to the clause on damages, see cases cited supra note 135, and text
thereto.
159. N. D. Rev. Code. § 28-0740 (1943).
160. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0740 (1943).
161. See discussion in note 73, supra. The writer considers this situation one that a
pleader should be very careful to explore beforehand, either by way of discovery procedure
under Rule 33 or by motion to require a reply.
162. J. R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Payne, 47 N. D. 100, 180 N.W. 968 (1920).
163. See discussion in Clark, Code Pleading 253-58 (2n ed. 1947); Hankin, Alterna-
tive and Hypothetical Pleadings, 33 Yale L. J. 365 (1924).
164. Clark, Code Pleading 353-54 (2d ed. 1947).
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party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capa-
city, he shall do so by specific negative averments, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleader'sknowledge.16
5
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all aver-
ments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions. of -mind of a person may be
averred generally.
166
(c) Conditions Precedent. In pleading the performance or
occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver gen-
erally that all conditions precedent have been performed or
have occurred. A denal of performance or occurrence shall be
made specifically and with particularity. 67
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official docu-
ment or official act it is sufficient to aver that the document was
issued or the act done in compliance with law; and in pleading
any ordinance or regulation of a county, city, village, or other
political subdivision, or any special, .local or private statute or
any right derived therefrom, or the laws of another jurisdiction,
it is sufficient to refer to the ordinance, regulation, statute, or
law by its title and date of its approval or in some other man-
ner with convenient certainty. 16
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a do-
mestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of
a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decis-
ion without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render
it. 169
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the. suffi-
ciency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material
and shall be considered like all other averments of special
matter.I--
(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are
claimed, they shall be specifically stated.
17
(h) Name of Party. When the pleader shall be ignorant of
the name of a party, such party may be designated in any
pleading or proceeding by any name and when the true name
165. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a). The superseded statutory pro-
vision listed by the Joint Committee is N. D. Rev. Code I 10-1401 (1943). Probably N.
D Rev. Code 1 28-0706 (2) (1943), should also be listed as superseded.
166. This' is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and is not listed as superseding
any North Dakota statute.
167. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(c) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code § 28-0728 (1943).
168. This is adapted from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(d) with some alterations and additions
It supersedes N. D. Rev. Code 1 28-0726 (1943).
169. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(e) and supersedes N. D. Rev. Code
28-0726 (1943)..
170. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(f) and is not listed as superseding
any North Dakota statute.
171. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Ci'. P. 9(g) and is not listed as superseding
any North Dakota statute.
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shall be discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amend-
ed accordingly.
172
A. General Comment; Rule 9(a). Rule 9 may virtually be read as
a supplement to the discussion of Rules 7 and 8. It contains a
number of miscellaneous provisions referring to matters which ex-
perience has indicated ought to be set forth specially in the plead-
ings. Rule 9(a) has reference to such matters as insanity, minority,
guardianship, lack of corporate existence and the like, which nor-
mally abate an action. Under present procedure, such questions
aie raised by demurrer.' Rule 9(a) requires them to be set forth
in the ansver and consequently changes practice in this respect.
The Joint Committee also lists Rule 9(a) as superseding § 10-1401
of the Code, which requires allegations of corporate status in the
complaint in all actions by or against a corporation. 7 4 This will
apparently be unnecessary in the future unless a party sees some
point in raising the issue of corporate status specially.'7 This is not
rormally the case and in most actions the allegation as to corpo-
rate status presently required in the complaint may be classed as a
useless formality. In cases where Rule 9(a) is applicable a cross-
reference to Rule 17 should normally be made.
B. Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. The present law
ot North Dakota is that where an answer pleads fraud as a defense,
ii general terms and 'without setting forth the fraudulent conduct
in terms of factual averments, it merely sets forth a conclusion of
law and is insufficient.' '" Rule 9(b) appears to strengthen this rule
and carry it further than existing local precedent, quite possibly
requiring some allegation which would normally be considered
evidentiary rather than ultimate facts. 77 The research of the writer
has disclosed no case dealing with pleading mistake in the North
Dakota reports.' 4 The second sentence of Rule 9(b), allowing
172. This provision is not found in the Federal Rules. It supersedes N. D. Rev. Code
28-0723 (1943).
173. N. D. Rev. Code I 28-0706 (2) (1943).
174. See McConnon & Co. v. Laursen, 22 N. D. 604, 135 N.W. 213 (1912).
175. See 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure J 301 (Rules Ed. 1950);
Montgomery, Changes in Federal Practice Resulting From the Adoption of the New Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 F. R. D. 337, 340 (1940).
176. Bergen Township v. Nelson County, 33 N. D. 247, 156 N.W. 559 (1916); Van
Dyke v. Doherty, 6 N. D. 263, 69 N.W. 200 (1896).
177. The elements of fraud are a false representation of a material fact, knowingly made,
with the intent that it be acted upon, reliance upon the truth of the representation by the
party to whom it was made, and resultant damage. It has been said that the phrase "cir-
cumstances constituting fraud" means allegations including the time, place, and contents
of the false representations, the facts misrepresented, and an identification of what has
been obtained. United States v. Hartmann, 2 F. R. D. 477 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
178. The writer assures the profession this doesn't necessarily mean someone else might
not be able to dig one up!
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general averments of malice, intent, knowledge and other condi-
tions of the mind seems to accord with present law.' °
C. Conditions Precedent. In Sifton v. Sifton,8"" the Court up-
held an allegation in a complaint "that the said plaintiff has fully
performed all the conditions of said instrument on her part," stating
that it duly alleged performance of the condition precedent in the
contract, and citing a specific code provision.' It is plain that
Rule 9(c) retains the meaning of the code provision in question
and the same result will be reached under the new rules.' 2 It is
equally plain that a breach of a condition subsequent must be
specially pleaded."' In McDowell v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company t '" the Court ruled in the syllabus that "it is the duty of
an insurance company to affirmatively plead breaches of conditions
contained in a policy." '
Who has the burden of proving performance of conditions?
Where the condition is a condition precedent, it is quite plain that
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof notwithstanding the pro-
vision that the defendant must make his -denial with particularity,
since the plaintiff must make at least a general allegation of per-
formance. Where the condition is subsequent, a plea setting up
the non-fulfillment of a condition subsequent would seem to con-
fess and avoid; and consequently the burden of proof would rest on
the defendant. I
T
D. Official Document or Act. The law of pleading with regard
to official documents and acts is inextricably intertwined with the
law of evidence as it relates to the subject of judicial notice. Con-
179. Roethke v. North Dakota Taxpayers Association, 72 N. D. 658, 10 N.W.2d 738
(1943).
180. 5 N. D. 187, 65 N.W. 670 (1895).
181. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0728 (1943).
182. This is another one of the many "circular" situations involved in the adoption of
the new rules. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0728 (1943) was originally adopted as a reform of
the common law rules of pleading, which required performance of conditions precedent to
he alleged meticulously. The Federal Rules, in turn, adopted the reform of the Field Code.
Now the Field Code states are generally adopting the Federal Rules. The result is the
survival of a Field Code provision completely unchanged.
183. Ceauchamp v. Retail Merchant's Association, 38 N. D. 483, 165 N.W. 545 (1917);
Ennis v. Retail Merchants Association M. F. Ins. Co., 33 N. D. 20, 156 N.W. 234 (1916).
184. 49 N. D. 176, 191 N.W. 350 (1922).
185. In view of the rule that a party required to plead something normally hears the
burden of proof with respect to it, this is pretty strong medicine for insurance companies
if it means what it says. Undoubtedly the holding is entitled to a rousing cheer frons every
plaintiff's lawyer! However, the opinion cites, in support of the proposition announced in
the syllabus, the cases listed in footnote 183, supra, dealing with conditions subsequent.
rossihly this means that despite the broad language in the syllabus, the rule of the case
will be considered applicable to only such conditions. Query: if the syllabus means ex-
actly what it says, are insurance companies enjoying the "equal protection of the laws"
required under the Constitution? They bear a burden of proof not imposed on anybody
else.
186. Sifton v. Sifton, supra.
187. Cases cited in footnote 183, supra.
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sequently the reader is referred, in conection with the problems
dealt With in Rule 9(d), to the excellent treatment of this subject
by the writer's colleague, Professor Leo H. Whinery, in the present
issue of the North Dakota Law Review.',-
E. Judgments. Rule 9(e) is plainly a continuation of the rule
embodied in the statute it supersedes.'
F. Time and Place. Rule 9(f) was incorporated in the Federal
Bules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of abolishing a former
practice in the federal courts under which it was possible to allege
any date or place and not be bound by it in proof because such
facts were not considered material.-9° It is of some importance
with regard to the defense of the statute of limitations. Rule 8(c)
provides that the statute of limitations must be affirmaively plead-
ed. Assuming that a complaint, in compliance with Rule 9(f),
alleges a date which makes it apparent on the face of the complaint
that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, may the
statute of limitations be applied by making a motion to dismiss?
The federal cases are in conflict."" The present law of North
Dakota is that the defense of the statute of limitations must be
raised by the answer, '92 is not available on demurrer, 93 and cannot
be the basis of a ruling by the court until the answer is actually
submitted." ' In view of the fact that the rule rests on statute here,
this will presumably continue to be the law.
G. Special Damage. Rule 9(g) is in accord with existing law
in this state.'3
H. Name of Party. Rule.9(h) simply continues the rule of the
statute it supersedes.'"
188. See ante this issue, pp. 29-30.
189. N. D..Rev. Code § 28-0726 (1943).
190. I-Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure J 307 (Rules Ed. 1950).
191. Id., § 281.
192. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0139 (1943).
193. Gilbertson v. Volden, 71 N. D. 192, 299 N.W. 250 (1941); Shane v. Peoples,
25 N. D..188, "141 N.W. 737 (1913). In Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Nepstad, 49 N. D.
221, 190 N.WV. 1009 (1922), it was similarly held that the statute of limitations could
not be invoked at the trial by objecting to the admission of any evidence on the ground
the complaint did not state a cause of action. In Gilbertson v. Volden, supra, the Court
ruled that a defendant could not call a failure to prosecute a case within the time pre-
scribed b . statute an instance of laches, and thereby raise the issue on demurrer.
194. Hagen v. Altman, 79 N.W.2d 53 (N. D. 1956) is the latest case on the point.
In that case a pre-trial examination of a party indicated his action was barred by the
statute of limitations, and the district court so ruled on the basis of the testimony, before
an answer was. put in. It was held this was premature.
195. The provisions of Rule 9(g)" will be most sharply applicable in actions of defama-
tion. See Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N. D. 578, 588-90, 268
NWV. 400, 406-07 (1936); Me.:erle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N. D. 568, 178 N.W.
792 11920), for discussion of the law surrounding special damages, so far as it 'elates
to pleading.
196. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0723 (1943).
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RULE 10. FORM OF PLEADINGS
(a) Caption; Names of Parties. Every pleading shall con-
tain a caption setting forth the name of the court and the
county in which the action is brought, the title of the action,
and a designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title of
the action shall include the names of all the parties, but in
other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first
party on each side with an appropriate indication of other
parties.0 7
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. All averments of
claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the
contents of each of which shall be limited as far as practicable
to a statement of a single set of circumstances; and a paragraph
may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings.
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or. occurrence
and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a sepa-
rate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear
presentation of the matters set forth. 19"
(c) Adoption by Reference; Exhibits. Statements in a plead-
ing may be adopted by reference in a different part of the
same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion. An ex-
hibit annexed to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. 91
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not rep-
resented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavits. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading
is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action
may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For
a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
200
Little comment is required with regard to the two foregoing
rules. Rule 10 deals essentially with formal matters only, though
197. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code If 8-0701 and 28-0702 (1) (1943).
198. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code § 28-0715 (1943).
199. This is taken verbatim frohn Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(c) and is not listed as superseding
any North Dakota statute.
200. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and supersedes N. D. Rev. Code
11 28-0720 and 28-3001 (1943).
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hule 10(b) with its provision referring to "each claim founded
upon a separate transaction or occurrence" serves to indicate the
nature of the claim under the new rules. 2'11 Rule 11, of course,
has already so commended itself to the profession through its re-
quirement of good faith and honesty in pleading that it was long
ago incorporated into the law of this state verbatim;"" and pleading
iri this state under Field Code procedure is presently regulated
by it.
Verification
One important technical point should be raised in connection
with Rule 11. It will be noted that the Rule provides distinctly that
"except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavits." Under
previous Code procedure it was necessary to file a verified com-
plaint before service by publication was permitted. 0 s Under the
new rules this is not required..2
0 4
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS -WHEN AND
HOW PRESENTED - BY PLEADING OR MOTION -
FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve his answer
within 20 days after the service of the summons- ° upon him,
unless the court directs otherwise when service of process is
made pursuant to Rule 4(f); (or) if a copy of the complaint be
not served with the summons, and demand therefor is made
pursuant to Rule 4(b), within 20 days after the service of the
complaint. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim
against him shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days after
the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days
after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs.
The service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these
periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by
order of the court: (1) if the court denies the motion or post-
pones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within 10 days after notice of the
court's action; (2) if the court grants a motion for a more
201. See discussion of the "claim" versus the "cause of action" following Rule 8(a),
supra.
202. N. D. Rev. Code 6 28-0720 (1943) was inserted in the 1943 revision of the code
by the revisors and, of course, copies Rule 11 word for word.
203. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0621 (1943).
204. N. D. R. Civ. P. 4(g) (2).
205. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) inserts the words "and complaint" at this point.
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definite statement the responsive pleading shall be served with-
in 10 days after the service of the more definite statement.20°
The foregoing rule has been redrafted from Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)
to reflect the difference between the method of commencing an
action in the federal courts and the method of commencing an
action in this state. ')2  It likewise omits provisions in the Federal
Rule relating to actions against the United States. Its most notable
alteration in existing procedure is found in the fact that it shortens
the time for answering from 30 to 20 days for the purpose of ex-
pediting suits; in conection with this matter the reader is referred
to the discussion of Rule 6(b), supra.-"'
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the re-
sponsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2)
lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process,
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making
any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further
pleading is permitted. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief
to which the adverse party is not required to serve a respon-
sive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or
fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the de-
fense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made per-
tinent to such a motion by Rule 56. - '
A. General Comment. It should be noted that Rule 12(b) does
not impose a requirement upon the pleader. It merely gives him an
206. This is adapted from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) with changes discussed in the text.
It supersedes N. D. Rev. Code §§ 28-0504, 28-0704 and 28-0716 (1943).
207. See discussion of N. D. R. Civ. P. 3 in the first installment of this paper, 32 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 88, 98 cf. seq. (1956). Since a federal action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court rather than by service of a summons upon the adverse party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) uses a first sentence which is somewhat simpler than the North
Dakota version: "A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 (lays after the service
of the summons and complaint upon him, unless the court directs otherwise when service
of process is made pursuant to Rule 4 (e)."
208. Ante, pp. 46.
209. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Cir. P. 12(). The superseded statutory
provisions are N. D. Rev. Code §§ 28-0706 (When Defendant May Demur), 28-0707
(Requisites of Demurrer), 28-0708 (Grounds for Deomurring Taken by Answer, When),
28-0709 (Grounds for Demurrer Waived Unless Objection Taken by Demurrer or Answer;
Exception), 28-0718 (Demurrer to Reply), and 28-1606 (Judgment Upon Issue of Law)
(1943).
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option to assert the enumerated defenses by way of motion rather
than answer, if he chooses to do so. Rule 12(d), below, indicates
that in the normal situation a motion raising one or more of the
seven specified defenses will be heard and determined before the
action itself is brought to trial. In a fine analysis of Rule 12 ap-
pearing some time ago in the North Dakota Law Review, Professor
John Baumann points out that Judge Clark opposed this provision,
arguing in favor of a rule based on the English pattern which
allows such hearings only where the judge belieyes the hearing will
substantially dispose of the case. -1" But the provisions of Rule
12(d) finally adopted quite plainly permit a trial judge to adopt
precisely such a policy if he desires.
In most cases, procedure under Rule 12(b) will be analogous to
the present procedure dealing with demurrers. In a broad sense, a
motion under this rule is the equivalent of a demurrer and serves
the same general function. But such a motion is not limited as al-
ready pointed out,21' to the role of the demurrer at common law
and under the Code. At one time there was very considerable
controversy about this matter among the federal judges. In the end
this resulted in a series of amendments to Rule 12, bringing it to its
present form, which definitely settled the question. Accordingly it
is now well established that a party presenting a motion to dismiss
for failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted may support it by matter outside the pleadings, such as
depositions and affidavits, showing that the plaintiff does not have
a claim in fact rather than in law.'12 In such situations, however,
Rule 12(b) ceases to be the basis of the motion. The motion is
automatically transformed into one for summary judgment under
Rule 56, which lays down a definite procedure for its disposition.
There seems to the writer, despite the fact that Rule 56 in terms
does not provide for the taking of oral testimony, no reason why a
proceeding under that Rule could not be combined with an exam-
ination of an adverse party under N. D. Rev. Code § 31-0203
(1943), if the judge before whom the case was being tried was of
opinion that this would be helpful. -1: But this is a matter on which
an answer lies eventually With the North Dakota Supreme Court.
210. Baumann, The Amendments to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
26 N. D. Bar Briefs 235 (1950).
211. See discussion of N.D.R.Civ.P. 
7
(c) and also discussion of N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b),
supra.
212. Note 211, supra.
213. This section provides that the examination of an adverse party provided for by
N. D. Rev. Code § 31-0202 (1943). which occurs at the trial of the case, may instead be
held at the option of the party claiming the right to preliminary examination "at any time
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B. Defenses Relating to Lack of Jurisdiction. The first two de-
fenses which Rule 12(b) stipulates may be raised by motion rather
than answer relate to jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and jurisdiction over the person. In federal proceedings, of
course, questions relating to jurisdiction are much more numerous
and usually more complex than in the state courts; and this provis-
ion is consequently a good deal more meaningful in the federal
than in the state context. Nevertheless, there are plenty of sit-
uations in which problems of jurisdiction over the subject matter
can arise in North Dakota. A party may, for instance, object to the
jurisdiction of the court in a divorce action because the plaintiff is
inot domiciled here2" ' or has not met the requiremnet of residence
for one year.2 1 5 Equally, a party may object to the jurisdiction of
the district court to deal with a matter allegedly reserved by the
Constitution to the disposition of the county court." ' These ex-
amples are illustrative rather than exhaustive, but indicate quite
clearly that despite the fact the District Courts are courts of general
jurisdiction they are at times faced with serious problems in this
regard.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
is closely related to the defenses of insufficiency of process or
insufficiency of service of process. These have been considered in
connection with Rule 4 and the reader is referred to the previous
installment of this paper for such discussion.217 It should be said,
however, that issues as to jurisdiction over a person may arise in-
dependently of the question whether the process was technically
valid or served in technically proper manner. To illustrate, where
jurisdiction is asserted under Rule 4(e) (2), which allows extra-
territorial service of process upon North Dakota domiciliaries, it is
plain a defendant may raise the argument he is not domiciled in
this state by way of motion under Rule 12(b).
Special and General Appearances
It should be specially noted that Rule 12(b) has the incidental
effect of making much of the former 'learning regarding special and
general appearances immaterial. Under Code practice, an objection
before the trial before a judge of the court in which the action is pending or before a
referee appointed for that purpose by a judge of-such court."
214. Graham v. Graham, 9 N. D. 88, 81 N.W. 44 (1899); Smith v. Smith, 7 N. D.
404, 74 N.W. 783 (1898).
215. Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom, 75 N. D. 667, 32 N.W.2d 106 (1948). See note,
225 N. D. Bar Briefs 262 (1949).
216. Hoff'nan v. Hoffman Heirs, 73 N. D. 637, 17 N.W.2d 903 (1945).
217. Cnm, The Proposed North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N.Dak.L.Rev. 88,
101 et seq. (1956).
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to jurisdiction over the person had to be taken by way of demurrer
before any other step was taken in the proceeding, or the objection
was waived. The new rules, however, permit a defendant to ques-
tion jurisdiction over his person at the same time that he files, for
example, a general denial of the allegations of the plaintiffs com-
plaint. Indeed, the assertion that the court lacks jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant may be made in an answer whereby a
defendant also pleads to the merits of the case without the slightest
risk of waiver.211
C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can Be Granted. The intent of the rules with regard to the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted has already been set forth in preceding portions of this
paper, 19 and only brief additional treatment need be given the
motion here. In some situations, it should be observed, technically
nice questions of the application of the rules are presented when a
pleader attempts to raise by this motion a defense of the sort speci-
fied in Rule 8(c). Thus, where a pleader observes on the face of
the opposing pleading a disclosure of the applicability of such a
defense as illegality, the statute of frauds, contributory negligence,
laches and the like, must he answer or is he permitted to assert such
defense by way of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim?
The scope of the motion is such that some courts have permitted
the application of the motion procedure on the common-sense
ground that it makes no difference which way one goes in requiring
the pleader to set up such an attack, since the end result is the
same anyhow. :2 Nevertheless there may be advantages resulting to
one side or the other from a construction of the rules one way or
the other,22 1 and the problem clearly deserves mention.
D. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party. Professor Baumann
comments that the "tendency to treat non-joinder of an indispens-
able party as a jurisdictional error is fallacious, since clearly a per-
son cannot legally be affected by a judgment in an in personam
suit to which he has not been made a party. '22 "Nevertheless," he
218. Untersinger v. United States, 172 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1949); Orange Theatre Corp.
v. Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1944); 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure 759 et seq. (Rules ed. 1950).
219. See comment to Rule 7(c), supra.
220. See 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 349 (Rules Ed. 1950),
for discussion.
221. At least, in Hagen v. Altman, 79 N.W.2d 53 (N. D. 1956), a very recent decision,
a party took the trouble to go to the Supreme Court on an issue of this sort.
222. Baumann, supra note 210, at 243.
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adds, "by Rule 12(b) and 12(h), this approach seems established
in the Federal Rules."
22 3
Who is an indispensable party? There is a distinction between a
necessary and indispensable party.22' Barron and Holtzoff define
indispensable parties as "persons who have an interest in the con-
troversy of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made with-
out either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such
a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience."22 The leading case on the
question is Shields v. Barrow,"' in which the Supreme Court of the
United States discussed and applied the distinction for the purpose
of holding that a complainant could not prosecute to judgment a
bill to rescind a contract of compromise and hold the adverse
parties to their original liability in a situation where the trial court
had jurisdiction of only two of the six parties to the contract.
A joint obligor on a promissory note is not an indispensable party
in an action to recover on the note. 2 2  The insured person under an
automobile liability insurance contract is indispensable in an action
for declaratory judgment by the insurance company to have the
contract declared void for breach of a condition.22" The state is an
indispensable party in actions to concel, change, or alter leases of
public school lands.229 These examples illustrate, but do not ex-
haust, the rules surrounding the indispensable party. It seems safe
to predict that the Supreme Court will eventually have to fix the
precise interpretation of this provision in this state independently;
though it is clear it will be generally in line with the materials here
presented.
(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the plead-
ings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial,
any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a
223. Ibid.
224. "The court here points out three classes of parties to a bill in equity. They are:
1. Formal parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to he
made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on,
and finally determine the entire controversey, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the
rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed necessary parties; but if their
interests are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can
proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting other persons not
before the court, the latter are not indispensable parties. 3. Persons who not only have
a,' interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot
be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition
that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."
Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 129 (U. S. 18.54).
225. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 357 (Rules Ed. 1950).
226. 17 How. 129 (U. S. 1854).
227. Greenleaf v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 140 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U. S.
736 (1944).
228. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Dupont, 21 F. Supp. 606 (Del. 1937).
229. De Grazier v. Panell Oil Corp., 109 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and dis-
posed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent
to such a motion by Rule 56.2"'
The motion for judgment on the pleadings allowed by Rule 12(c)
is very similar in effect and operation to the motion to dismiss an.
action for failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. This is manifest from the fact that, precisely as in
the case of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
motion for judgment on the pleadings translates into a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 in the event that matter outside
the face of the pleadings is tendered in support of it.
In theory it would seem a difference between the motion for
judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim ought to exist, at least where the motions strike only to the
face of the pleadings. Logically the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim ought merely, if granted, to abate the action. Normal-
ly, leave to plead over ought to be granted in such situations. At-
tention is called, however, to the fact that in some situations the
federal courts have ruled that a dismissal of this sort constitutes
matter in bar rather than matter in abatement.2 " This line of hold-
ings makes the difference between the two motions under discus-
sion merely one of time: the motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim may be tendered before the pleadings are closed, the motion
for judgment on the pleadings normally comes afterward. It is clear
in any event that the motion for judgment on the pleadings, if
gianted, amounts to a substantive adjudication. This is true
whether the motion is granted on the face of the pleadings or also
after a consideration of additional matter from affidavits, deposi-
tons, and the like. 3
(d) Preliminary Hearings. The defenses specifically enume-
rated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in
a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment men-
tioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and deter-
mined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred
until the- trial.1
33
230. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The superseded statutes are
N. D. Rev. Code §1 28-1104 (2) and 28-1606 (1943).
231. Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601 (7th Cir.
1948); Topping v. Fry, 147 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1945); 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 356 (Rules Ed. 1950).
232. Noel v. Olds, 149 F.2d 13 (D. C. App. 1945).
233. This is taken verbatim from Fed R. Civ. P. 12(d) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code § 28-1104 (1) (1943).
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(e) Motion for More Definite Statement. If a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or am-
bigous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite state-
ment before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion
shall point out the defects complained of and the details de-
sired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is
not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within
such time as the court may fix, the court may strike the plead-
ing to which the motion was directed or make such order as it
deems just.2"'
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is per-
mitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20
days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon the
court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." 5
The provisions of Rule 12(d) are plainly directory rather than
mandatory, and indicate an area of considerable discretion vested
in the trial judge. A similar comment may be made with regard to
Rules 12(e) and 12(f). Commentators have suggested that to some
extent Rule 12(e) is inconsistent with the general philosophy of
pleading embodied in the rules and constitutes an invitation to
counsel to seek unnecessary particularization. 2'" Equally, an ex-
pansive and generous application of Rule 12(e) has been warmly
advocated.1 7 To the writer, the proper application of the rule
would appear to depend on purely pragmatic considerations of
trial convenience varying from case to case.
(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who makes a motion
under this rule may join with it the other motions herein pro-
vided for and then available to him. If a party makes a motion
under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and
objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based
on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as pro-
vided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
238
(h) Waiver of Defenses. A party waives all defenses and
234. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code J§ 28-0724 and 28-0725 (1943).
235. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and supersedes. N. D. Rev.. Code
If 28-0713, 28-0722, and 28-0910 (1943).
236. Baumann, supra note 210, at 240; Clark, Simplified Pleadings,_2 F. R. D. A56,
466 (1943).
237. Caskey and Young, The Bill of Particlars- A Brief For the Defendant, 27 Va. L.
Rev. 472 (1941). This article argues that a "defendant is entitled to know the extent of
the plaintiff's claim before the commencemen tof the trial and the fcats upon which it is
based," and is entitled to a bill of particulars for the purpose in cases where the trouble
and expense of pre-trial examination are bothersome.
238. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g) and supersedes no North Dakota
statute.
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objections which he does not present either by motion as here-
inbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer
or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading,
if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings
or at the trial of the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court
Jacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any
evidence that may have been received.2:32
A. Comment on Rule 12(g). The meaning of Rule 12(g) must be
ascertained by looking to its history. Under the original version of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant could set up his
defenses in three stages. He could first make a motion setting up
one or more of the defenses listed in Rule 12(b) and numbered
(1) to (5) - e. g. a motion testing jurisdiction. Losing on this
motion, he could then file a second motion setting up the defense
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and asking for
a more definite statement, or asking the court to strike a portion of
the complaint. Lastly, he filed an answer.
-2 4'
Rule 12(g) allows defenses to come in only by two stages, a pre-
liminary motion and an answer. If a pleader files a motion under
Rule 12(b), for instance, he must join in that motion any requests
for the application of Rules 12(e) and 12(f). With that single
preliminary motion before the court, he must then plead to the
substance of the case in his answer. This has been criticized on the
ground a pleader ought to be able to file a motion for more definite
statement and then raise objections to -a complaint finally put in
proper form by a subsequent motion under Rule 12(b). The argu-
ment is in substance that a pleader ought to have before him a
complaint which he finds intelligible prior to the time he is re-
quired to assert defenses to it. 4 ' There seems no reason, however,
why the trial court, in a proper case, might not in a proper case
give relief to a pleader in this position by an order enlarging the
time for answering or making a motion under Rule 12(b).24" As a
239. This is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) and supersedes N. D. Rev.
Code J 28-0709 (1943).
240. See discussion in Baumann, supra note 210, at 241-42.
241. Armstrong, Report of Advisory Committee, 5 F. R. D. 339, 344 (1946), suggests
that a " Motion for a more definite statement should be permitted to be made without
operating as a waiver of the right to make subsequent motions."
242. See discussion of Rule 6(b), supra. Note also that Rule I declares that the rules
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general proposition, the idea that expedition in the trial of a case
requires all preliminary objections to be raised at one time seems
it sound one.
B. Comment on Rule 12(h). The penalty for failure to comply
with the provisions of Rule 12(g) is indicated by Rule 12(h),
which provides that a party who fails to present an objection to a
preceding pleading either by motion or answer thereby waives it,
with certain specified exceptions. It will be noted that the Rule
under discussion continues the present rule of this state that an
objection to a pleading as failing to state a valid cause of action or
defense may be made at the trial, notwithstanding that this ground
of objection is not taken in the pleadings.!'" This procedure, while
legitimate, is regarded with disfavor by the court under present
procedure.' 4- Under the new rules the policy against this type of
trial tactic is continued, since Rule 15(b) provides for an extremely
liberal policy with regard to permitting amendments to meet such
objections.
(i) Offer of Fixed Damages; Service. In an action arising
on contract, the defendant with his answer may serve upon the
plaintiff an offer in writing that if he fails in his defense the
damages be assessed at a special sum, and if the plaintiff signi-
fies his acceptance thereof in writing with or before the notice
of trial and on the trial has a verdict, the damages must be
assessed accordingly.
2 5
(j) Effect If Offer of Fixed Damages Rejected. If the plain-
tiff does not accept an offer of fixed damages, he must prove his
damages as if it had not been made and shall not be permitted
to introduce such offer in evidence. If the damages in his favor
do not exceed the sum mentioned in the offer, the defendant
shall recover his costs incurred in consequence of any necessary
preparations or defense in respect to the question of dam-
ages.
2 4
The foregoing provisions are not found in the Federal Rules.
They merely continue unchanged the provisions of two North Da-
kota statutes relating to practice which do not appear to have been
construed by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
To BE CONTINUED
"shall he construed to secure the just. speedy, and inexpensiv, determination of eery
action."
243. Guild v. More, 32 N. D. 432, 155 N.W. 44 (1915).
244. Ibid.
245. Rule 12(i) is new material not found in the federal rules and continues the pro-
visions of N. D. Rev. Code 0 28-0711 (1943.
246. Rule 12(j) is new material not found in the federal rules and continues the pro-
visions of N. 1). Rev. Code J 28-0712 (1943).
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